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Introduction 
 
 Although Romania acceded to the European Union (EU) in 2007, serious questions remain 
regarding the presence of rule of law and democratic governance within the country. As recently as 
2012, disputes between top leadership officials in Romania and accusations of corruption have been 
a cause for concern in the international community. EU Commission President José Manuel Barroso 
indicated that Romania has to “remove all doubts on its commitment to the rule of law, the 
independence of the judiciary and the respect for constitutional rulings” or face the EU’s 
displeasure.1 Romania’s struggles with implementing a stable political system and promoting 
democratic governance have been especially acute since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of 
communism. For many observers, its wavering commitment to democracy, faltering market 
economy, and tenuous respect for human rights could have seriously undermined its bid for 
membership in both the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  
In spite of Romania’s apparent failure to fully satisfy NATO and EU membership 
requirements, it joined both organizations in 2004 and 2007, respectively. How was this possible? 
Why did NATO and the EU allow Romania to join if there were serious flaws in its membership 
application? Does this suggest that NATO and the EU are not paying enough attention to states’ 
imperfections with respect to membership requirements? Or, do NATO and the EU look to other 
factors when determining membership besides the stated criteria? Romania’s case reveals that 
NATO and EU decision-making when it comes to admitting new members is much more complex 
that a cursory glance would indicate. To add to the puzzle, NATO and the EU admitted states prior 
to the end of the Cold War whose membership applications were in pristine order (i.e. the United 
Kingdom). They also admitted states whose applications appeared lacking (i.e. Greece and Spain). !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 “Symbol of Romanian Leadership? Hands on a Throat,” New York Times (2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/20/world/europe/in-romania-rancor-between-top-leaders.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, 
Accessed: 21 October 2012.  
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As evidenced by Romania’s admission to both organizations after the Cold War ended, NATO and 
the EU have also accepted states in recent years whose domestic political and economic situations 
do not appear to align with the institutions’ usual standards. States like Belarus and Moldova are not 
even courted by NATO and the EU as potential members given the troubling nature of their 
political structure and economic activity, yet Romania and Bulgaria, arguably similarly flawed, still 
acceded.2 Again, the question is, why did a state like Romania gain admission to both the EU and 
NATO while states like Belarus and Moldova are not able to even entertain membership 
aspirations? While the UK’s 1973 accession to the EU unsurprisingly presented little difficulty in 
terms of its democracy and market structure, other applicants like Romania and Bulgaria presented 
more of a challenge. The EU and NATO often make some surprising choices in terms of new 
members, which begs the question of why institutions behave the way they do when enlargement 
decisions are on the table.  
The question of institutional enlargement has long been a concern of international 
organizations and their member states. Institutions’ motivations for enlargement have changed over 
time and institutions, however similar they may seem, have very different perspectives on how to 
pursue an enlargement agenda. Desire for more military power, an interest in spreading 
democratization, or other institutional values and norms may spur expansion. Despite the rational 
objectives that institutions put forth when deciding whether or not to enlarge, there is an occasional 
tendency to behave irrationally, or what may appear irrationally, when accepting new members. 
States have been admitted to both institutions even though gaps in fulfilling the membership criteria 
were present, but perhaps not given enough attention at the time of accession. To attempt to answer 
the question of why institutions accept members with problematic applications, I will look at the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Ivan Katchanovski, “Puzzles of EU and NATO Accession of Post-Communist Countries,” Perspectives on European 
Politics and Society 12 (3) (2011): 305. 
Wall 8 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) in order to compare and 
contrast differences in expansion policies and practices.  
My research question investigates whether or not prospective EU and NATO member states 
fulfilled the membership criteria associated with each organization and, if not, as is commonly 
believed, why they were still admitted. I consider enlargement both during and after the Cold War 
with case studies focusing on Spain, Poland, and Romania. NATO and the EU both revised their 
approaches to enlargement after the end of the Cold War; consequently, I will seek to answer what 
changed while comparing and contrasting different waves of enlargement for each organization. 
The findings provide a more complete picture and offer explanations for otherwise perplexing 
institutional behavior. Such insights can answer questions not only about how international 
institutions react to interest in membership, but also analyze what internal and external pressures 
motivate NATO and the EU to expand. I will focus on the supply side of enlargement (the 
institutional side) and not the demand side (whether and why aspiring member states are interested 
in membership or not). I will examine alternative explanations for institutional behavior rooted in 
normative, economic, and political influences that may compel international institutions to enlarge.   
In this thesis, I find that the EU and NATO each admitted member states that did not 
completely fulfill the criteria for membership. In addition, I will argue that both organizations 
proceeded with enlargement (despite the risks) when institutional and member state interests 
aligned in support of expansion. Enlargement also occurred so that the two institutions could spread 
liberal norms and values to the new member states. This research puzzle is important because it 
offers insight into potentially risky institutional behavior brought about by admitting states that did 
not fulfill the basic criteria. More importantly, the puzzle seeks to answer why some aspiring 
member states acceded while others were not so fortunate. Finally, the research will explore how 
prior enlargement decisions might affect future waves of enlargement and will also explore what 
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factors are the most compelling when determining membership. In order to look into how NATO 
and the EU approached enlargement, I will now examine the history of enlargement for both 
institutions.  
 
History of Enlargement 
 NATO and the European Community (which became the European Union under the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1993)3 both emerged in the aftermath of World War II. NATO was instituted 
in 1949 in order to create a military alliance between the United States and members of the Western 
European community. In 1957, the European Community (EC) developed as a unifying economic 
body intended to bring peace to relations between West European powers. As the Cold War 
progressed, both NATO and the EU began to expand their borders to include new members. 
Enlargement can be defined as the process by which states not previously members of NATO or the 
EU accede to and become official members of either organization. According to Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeir, enlargement can also be described as a “process of gradual and formal horizontal 
institutionalization.”4 A system of horizontal institutionalization implies that when states accede to 
either NATO or the EU, they effectively integrate within the organization, but still maintain their 
sovereignty and national interests (as do the existing members of the organizations).  
During the Cold War, expansion occurred in both institutions, but not on the same scale as 
when the Cold War ended. Greece and Turkey acceded to NATO in 1952, West Germany acceded 
in 1955, and Spain acceded in 1982.5 Britain, Ireland, and Denmark joined the EU in 1973 while 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 “When did the EC come to be called the EU?” Folketinget. http://www.euo.dk/euo_en/spsv/all/10/. Accessed: 20 
January 2013.  
4 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeir, “Theorizing EU Enlargement: Research, Focus, Hypotheses, and the 
State of Research,” Journal of European Public Policy 9 (4) (2002): 502.  
5 “NATO Enlargement,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2009), 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm, Accessed: 30 September 2012.  
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Spain, Portugal, and Greece joined in the 1980s.6 Once the Cold War ended, multiple waves of EU 
and NATO enlargement occurred. First, after a brief negotiation period, Austria, Finland, and 
Sweden acceded to the European Union in 1995.7 In the first major enlargement eastward, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland acceded to NATO in 1999,8 followed by Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia in 2004.9 Also in 2004, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined the 
EU.10 Bulgaria and Romania entered the EU in 2007.11 Finally, Albania and Croatia entered NATO 
in 2009.12  
After the end of the Cold War, the process of enlargement became more contested with the 
question of integrating the former Eastern bloc. The EU and NATO both rushed to clarify the 
criteria for membership especially since the states clamoring for membership were formerly under 
Communist rule. According to Ivan Katchanovski, states that were once under Soviet occupation 
faced resistance when they attempted to join both the EU and NATO since there were inherent 
cultural and political biases in the West against the former Soviet republics.13 Up to that point, 
NATO and the EU were (mainly) comprised of states that formed Western Europe. Expansion to 
include Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) was entirely new to both organizations 
that traditionally looked to include Western states only. However, the end of the Cold War signaled 
a new chapter in enlargement history. Once confronted with membership appeals from states that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 “European Enlargement,” Civitas (2011), http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/FSMS/MS1.htm, Accessed: 30 September 
2012.  
7 Ibid  
8 “Member Countries,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2012), 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52044.htm, Accessed: 10 December 2012.  
9 Ibid 
10 “European Enlargement,” Civitas (2011), http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/FSMS/MS1.htm, Accessed: 30 
September 2012.  
11 Ibid 
12 “Member Countries,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2012), 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52044.htm, Accessed: 10 December 2012.!
13 Katchanovski, “Puzzles of EU and NATO Accession of Post-Communist Countries,” 306.  
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were culturally distinct from the West, NATO and the EU realized that if they were to successfully 
instill democratic values in the new states, they must refine their membership criteria to include 
clear expectations of democratic governance, a market economy, and respect for human rights and 
minority groups in aspiring member states. NATO and the EU did not follow specific steps for 
accession before the Cold War’s end, but with more calls for membership after the Cold War, both 
organizations developed and adhered to specific steps so that the enlargement process was 
streamlined and the membership criteria was clearly represented. I will discuss the specific 
membership criteria for NATO and the EU and its evolution after the Cold War in Chapter 2.  
 
Membership Processes 
Within the accession processes, both NATO and the EU have institutionalized steps that 
aspiring member states follow in order to integrate into and accede to each organization. The three 
stages that precede EU accession are as follows: when a country submits a complete membership 
application, it becomes a candidate for membership as soon as the European Council approves it, 
the candidate then goes through a negotiation process that involves accepting EU laws and 
regulations, and finally when the negotiations and reforms have been satisfactorily completed, the 
country can enter the European Union pending Council approval.14 Although this appears to be a 
relatively simple set of steps to gain accession, the actual process is much more complicated and 
involves lengthy accession discussions. NATO follows a similar accession process with a few 
differences. In order to start the accession process, countries must be invited to become a member 
before beginning accession talks with a NATO team and sign accession protocols, NATO at large 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 “Enlargement,” European Commission (2012), http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/steps-towards-
joining/index_en.htm, Accessed: 10 December 2012.  
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either chooses to sign the accession protocols or not, and, if NATO signs the accession protocols, 
the NATO Secretary General officially invites candidates to accede.15  
Before countries entered NATO, they typically participated in either the Partnership for 
Peace (in the 1990s) or the Membership Action Plan (present-day). The Partnership for Peace (PFP) 
allowed aspiring member states to strengthen their military capacity so that they could eventually 
join NATO.16 As NATO’s accession process evolved, NATO also developed the Membership 
Action Plan (MAP), which “provides a framework for enlargement with NATO as aspirants carry 
out the reforms needed for possible future membership.”17 When states desire to join the European 
Union, they sign a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), which outlines “common 
political and economic objectives and encourages regional cooperation” before the EU accession 
process begins.18 
 
Explanations for Enlargement 
The motivations behind enlargement varied significantly during and after the Cold War. For 
NATO, countries’ strategic location preceded concerns about the presence of democratic values, 
respect for human rights, or the peaceful resolution of conflicts. With the looming threat of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), NATO was more willing to overlook the lack of 
democratic control of the military, for example. Despite concerns about the democratic stability of 
states like Turkey, Greece, and Spain, all three countries were still admitted to NATO. NATO’s 
primary concern with regards to enlargement before the end of the Cold War was to further the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 “NATO Enlargement,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2012), 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm, Accessed: 10 December 2012.  
16 Jeffrey Simon, “Crossing the Rubicon,” NATO After Fifty Years, eds. S. Victor Papacosma, Sean Kay, and Mark R. 
Rubin (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc, 2001), 125. 
17 “NATO Enlargement,” International Delegation: UK and NATO (2012), http://uknato.fco.gov.uk/en/uk-in-nato/new-
nato-partners/nato-enlargement, Accessed: 10 December 2012.  
18 “Stabilisation and Association Agreement,” European Commission (2012), 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/saa_en.htm, Accessed: 10 December 2012.  
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“collective defense protection of alliance membership.”19 More importantly, NATO enlarged in 
order to strengthen its collective military power in the face of a common enemy: the Soviet Union. 
NATO described its desire for a “return to Europe,”20 a movement towards promoting unity on the 
European continent. Now that the Soviet threat was nonexistent, NATO believed that it could fully 
devote itself to enlargement with the goal of bringing a zone of peace to Europe.21 NATO 
enlargement also served the purpose of providing stability for the Central and Eastern European 
countries that were reeling from the absence of their former Soviet protector.22 
In short, without the threat of the former USSR, NATO could build on its previous 
unification and expand to involve the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) in that 
unification as well. US President Bill Clinton’s “not if, but when” rhetoric of the 1990s inspired the 
CEECs to seek NATO membership.23 Indeed, the United States’ desire to see NATO expand cannot 
be underestimated in importance. Arguably the most powerful actor in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, the United States exerts a strong influence over enlargement processes. NATO’s 
interest in expanding had much to do with the United States’ desire to see NATO expand. The US 
remained the key proponent of NATO enlargement because of the low transaction costs required to 
maintain “a large degree of autonomy” in European affairs.24 Once NATO began to incorporate 
enlargement into its foreign policy agenda, it needed to codify the criteria it would use to evaluate 
potential member states. Although the 1949 Washington Treaty vaguely alluded to the process for 
enlargement, it was not until 1995 that NATO decided to lay out its criteria for membership in its 
Study on Enlargement.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 Simon, “Crossing the Rubicon,” 121. 
20 Ibid, 129.  
21 Ibid, 127.!!
22 Ronald D. Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2002): 30.  
23 Ibid, 123.  
24 Katja Weber, Hierarchy Amidst Anarchy: Transaction Costs and Institutional Choice (Albany, New York: State 
University of New York Press, 2000): 108.  
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Part of the EU’s mandate is to economically revive Western Europe and provide a 
formalized process for future enlargement. The destruction of World War II caused European states 
to begin a project of bringing peace and reunification to the continent.25 Originally, though, the 
European Community was formed to create a sense of economic cooperation among the Western 
European states. With the addition of each new member state, the European Union sought to deepen 
the ties that connected the member states to foster more economic cohesion and integration. In a 
move to acknowledge its economic beginnings, the EU looks at prospective states’ economic 
stability as market economies before deciding to enlarge or not.26 The EU also considers a number 
of factors when determining whether or not to enlarge: a state’s economic situation, respect for 
human rights, and the presence of democracy, to name a few.27 When potential member states 
appear strongly positioned to contribute significantly to the European Union, the EU responds 
favorably to those states’ petitions for membership. On the other hand, the EU also admits states 
that may not display all of the required features of an ideal member state, which is the focus of this 
thesis.  
In the case of the European Union, enlargement was not the major political issue in the 
1970s and 1980s that it has become since the end of the Cold War. For example, Greece struggled 
to present solid economic credentials when pursuing membership in the EU, but the EU looked 
favorably on the fact that Greece was already a member of NATO and appeared to be “traditionally 
tied to [the West].”28 Greece acceded to the EU with relative ease, but the newly liberated CEECs in 
search of EU membership have faced much more of an uphill climb. Despite its initial reluctance, 
the EU looked to enlargement as “the locomotive for future growth in both the old and new parts of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Walker, Europe in the New Century, 58.  
26 “Enlargement,” European Commission (2012), http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-
membership/index_en.htm, Accessed: 17 January 2013.  
27 Ibid.!!
28 Daniel C. Thomas, “The Construction of Europe: Communal Identity and the Politics of EU Enlargement” (paper 
presented at Cornell University in honor of Peter Katzenstein, October 13-15, 2011), 256.  
Wall 15 
Europe.”29 To maintain relevance and legitimacy, the EU supported expansion in order to solidify 
its status as a competent international actor. The EU’s offer of membership is a powerful incentive 
for states to fulfill the acquis communautaire, the body of EU laws required to be considered for 
membership.30 Several of the CEECs have worked to incorporate the acquis communautaire in their 
domestic laws to prepare for EU accession. The acquis communautaire laid out the obligations of 
EU membership that aspiring member states must put into effect before they can be considered 
members of the European Union. The EU reacted to the calls for membership after the end of the 
Cold War and responded by laying out clear requirements. Despite the strict requirements that the 
EU put forth, all of the states admitted did not necessarily fulfill the basic membership expectations, 
which contributes to my research question of why they were still admitted.  
 
Argument Overview 
In this thesis, I will determine what parts of the membership criteria admitted states did not 
completely fulfill before accession and then explain why NATO and the EU went ahead with 
expansion anyway. Certainly the desire to enlarge was strong in both NATO and the EU, but further 
investigation into why enlargement proceeded despite the risks associated with incomplete 
membership qualifications is needed. I will argue that NATO and the EU did not place great 
emphasis on the three trademarks of a liberal democratic system (democratic governance, a 
functional market economy, and respect for human rights) until the 1990s. However, in the early 
years of enlargement (1950-1980), both NATO and the EU looked for, but did not require, signs of 
the three marks of a liberal democracy in prospective member states. As long as aspiring member !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 Martin Walker, Europe in the New Century: Visions of an Emerging Superpower, ed. Robert J. Guttman (Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 2001), 57.  
30 “Acquis communautaire,” Eurofund (2007), 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/definitions/acquiscommunautaire.htm, Accessed: 
27 November 2012.  
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states displayed progress and improvement in these three areas, NATO and the EU proceeded with 
enlargement because both sought to spread liberal norms and values to the aspiring member states. 
When the Cold War ended, though, both institutions produced documents detailing the requirements 
for admission. Since both NATO and the EU claimed to value the three aspects of a liberal 
democracy, they knew that it was time to translate their beliefs into clear expectations and codify 
them in official criteria. The EU’s Copenhagen Criteria and NATO’s 1995 Study on Enlargement 
established these clear membership expectations.   
Further, NATO was primarily preoccupied with defending its members’ borders from any 
Soviet act of aggression during the Cold War. In a military alliance, coordinating effective defense 
policy took precedence over building a shared liberal democratic identity. When the Cold War 
ended, NATO turned to expansion as the solution to revitalize Europe, keep the US engaged in 
European affairs, and encourage the spread of democracy across Europe.31 I will also argue that the 
EU and NATO both naively believed that if states were admitted, their human rights records, 
market economies, and democratic governance would continue to progress upwards by virtue of 
being a member of an organization that professed to uphold liberal democratic values. Once the 
Cold War ended, though, both NATO and the EU took new measures to ensure that the conditions 
for membership were more explicitly stated and revolved around fostering a liberal democracy in 
new states.  
 
Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Member State Interests  
 Realist, neoliberal, and constructivist schools of thought typically dominate contemporary 
debates about the explanations for EU and NATO enlargement. Realist theories highlight “material !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era, 33.  
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power and the resilience of the state.”32 On the other hand, liberal intergovernmentalists argue that 
war is likely to be averted and peace maintained as long as states adopt democratic systems because 
democracies rarely engage in warfare with each other.33 Liberal intergovernmentalism holds that 
member states formulate their enlargement decisions based on national preferences and then bring 
their preferences to the institutional level.34 While realists and liberal intergovernmentalists discuss 
material power and national preferences respectively, constructivists stress that institutions shape 
the norms, behavior, and identities of new member states so that they fit the institutional model.35 I 
will first discuss realism and its connection to institutional enlargement. I will then look at 
neoliberalism and liberal intergovernmentalism as well as constructivism.  
 
Realism  
Unlike the EU, NATO has faced the need to assert powerful reasons for its continued 
existence since the threat (the USSR) has been eliminated. With the Cold War’s end, NATO 
expanded its security operations to provide stability in the Balkans region in an effort to maintain 
relevance.36 Despite NATO’s efforts to remain relevant and active in international security, realists 
argue that NATO is on the way out. The structural realist perspective espoused by Waltz suggests, 
“NATO is a disappearing thing.”37 Further, Waltz expects “NATO to dwindle at the Cold War’s 
end.”38 Waltz’s argument suggests that NATO served member states’ interests when it functioned 
as a military alliance during the Cold War. Now that the Cold War has ended, Waltz does not 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Mark A. Pollack, “International Relations Theory and European Integration,” European University Institute (2000): 5.  
33 Ibid, 8.  
34 Ibid.  
35 Ibid, 19. !
36 “NATO in the Balkans,” NATO Briefing (2005): 1.  
37 Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO,” in The Culture of 
National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1996), 363.  
38 Kenneth N. Waltz, “NATO expansion: A realist’s view,” Contemporary Security Policy 21 (2) (2000): 28.  
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foresee that member states will require NATO’s security protection since the threat has disappeared. 
In order to answer the question of why NATO persists, Waltz suggests that dominant state actors 
like the US want to retain their grip on European foreign policy affairs; therefore, NATO persists 
because the US wants it to survive.39 According to the realists, power-based theories explain why 
NATO continues to expand even without a clear threat to its current state of security. As Waltz 
mentions, the US wishes to remain involved in European affairs and continued enlargement serves 
this purpose because the US has a voice in expressing when and how states are admitted.  
Adding to Waltz’s argument, Mearsheimer articulates that survival is the most crucial 
objective for any state.40 According to Mearsheimer and other realists, NATO is no longer effective 
or necessary in the absence of the Soviet threat.41 Enlargement, therefore, is a puzzling course of 
action for a dying institution and the member states that sustain it. Nevertheless, Mearsheimer 
acknowledges that enlargement occurs and attributes this to the fact that member states’ national 
and international interests spur expansion. Mearsheimer argues, “the most powerful states in the 
system create and shape institutions so that they can maintain their share of world power, or even 
increase it.”42 Other realists like Genov support Mearsheimer’s claim that states are the dominant 
actors and institutions cannot hope to command the same degree of power that states do.43 If 
institutions enlarge, it is because the most powerful members have an interest in enlargement and 
pursue those interests through those institutions; consequently, institutions do not have any agency 
in the enlargement process. Instead, they are entirely dependent on member states’ interests and 
desires.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 Ibid, 29.  
40 John Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” International Security 15 (1) 
(1990): 44.  
41 Ibid, 1.  
42 Ibid, 13.  
43 Georgy Genov, “NATO and EU Enlargement and Globalisation Policies: Re-conceptualization of Security 
Priorities?” Economic Alternatives (1) (2010): 30.  
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In particular, member states also looked to expansion as a way to provide more security and 
military protection. States focus on increasing their security networks by adding new members to 
NATO and the EU. Since cooperative security enables “strategic interdependence,” member states 
are more likely to support accession if they can enhance their security and military power.44 It 
makes more sense to have states locked into a military alliance with each other than to worry about 
the possibility that a certain state may begin to act aggressively. For example, in the case of NATO 
enlargement, Hyde-Price argues that Germany, one of Europe’s most economically powerful states, 
“had no desire to remain the western bulwark of the Alliance and wanted a belt of NATO members 
to its east.”45 If Germany could ensure that NATO’s borders extended into Eastern Europe, then it 
would have a buffer zone between the Soviet Union and itself, which would reduce its fears about 
an attack from the Soviet Union. Thus, security concerns motivated Germany to support 
enlargement eastward.  
Hyde-Price also argues that EU enlargement will “stimulate further economic 
development…[and] it will provide a multilateral context for German economic power and political 
influence.”46 For example, both Germany and the UK have “strong business interests” in Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE) and “have been the most eager to push the enlargement agenda” as a 
result.47 Germany and the UK’s preferences clearly demonstrate that member states often favor 
accession when their own economic or military interests can be enhanced via expansion. In 
addition, domestic pressures spurred member states to support enlargement. Multinational 
corporations (MNCs) wanted to branch out into new member states because of “location-specific 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 Barry Posen and Andrew Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,” International Security 21 (3) 
(1996/1997): 23.  
45 Adrian Hyde-Price, “The Antinomies of European Security: Dual Enlargement and the Reshaping of European 
Order,” Contemporary Security Policy 21 (2) (2000): 142.  
46 Ibid, 150. 
47 Walter Mattli and Thomas Plümper, “The demand-side politics of EU enlargement: democracy and the application for 
EU membership,” Journal of European Public Policy 9 (4) (2002): 556.  
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advantages, including low labor costs, low material costs, and market proximity.”48 Enlargement to 
the East would allow European investors to extend their business ventures in states where EU laws 
and regulations would apply.49 MNCs also pressured states to support enlargement so that they 
could gain a foothold in a new economy and increase their global competitiveness.50   
As Hyde-Price points out, when the member states saw clear political, economic, and 
security benefits associated with enlargement, they were more likely to advocate for it. If the 
member states did not support expansion, the institution itself could not push enlargement through 
since it must first serve its member states’ interests. As long as the member states withhold their 
support for enlargement, the institution could not expand.  
 
Liberalism  
Although the European Union began as a peace and integration project in Europe, member 
states primarily controlled the institution’s activities and tended to emphasize economic 
enhancement, not collective defense like NATO. As a result, member states did not focus on 
defense until much later since NATO was already working on securing the North Atlantic region. 
Instead, the European Union member states hearkened back to the initial reason for the EU’s 
formation: to bring about a Europe that was economically integrated. EU member states looked for 
new members that could contribute to the EU’s economic prosperity. Mearsheimer explains that 
states are looking to increase their economic satisfaction and provide stability to new member states 
(especially in Eastern Europe) while creating “a liberal economic order that allows free economic 
exchange between states.” 51  This is the theory of economic liberalism, which encourages 
enlargement as a way to increase economic opportunities. The member states have an interest in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 Ibid, 555.   
49 Ibid, 556.  
50 Ibid.!!
51 Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” 42.  
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enhancing their economic opportunities and will advocate for enlargement if prospective members 
can contribute significantly to economic advancement in the European Union.  
Because member states have compelling interests, they decide whether or not the institutions 
decide to enlarge. To further the liberal intergovernmentalism approach, Moravcsik argues, 
“governments first define a set of interests and then bargain among themselves in an effort to realize 
those interests.”52 Since EU member states concentrated on economic interests at first, they worked 
on the national level to establish their individual preferences and then worked with each other to 
bargain and compromise. In essence, member states control the enlargement agenda according to 
their domestic interests and preferences. Domestic pressures and considerations motivated states to 
support enlargement at the institutional level when it suited their interests.  
 
Constructivism 
Although member states often consider security interests when deciding whether or not to 
support enlargement, they may have other intentions at the same time. Constructivists add another 
dimension to why member states driving enlargement policies choose to enlarge. They argue that 
member states are capable of “constructing” potential member states’ identities so that they fit in 
seamlessly with the rest of the European community.53 Schimmelfennig suggests, “Liberal human 
rights (i.e. individual freedoms, civil liberties, and political rights) are at the center of the 
community’s collective identity.”54 Because EU and NATO member states value liberal human 
rights and are concerned with forming a cohesive European community, they look to expansion to 
foster these values in new member states.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 Andrew Moravcsik, “A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach to the EC,” Journal of Common Market Studies 31 (4) 
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Schimmelfennig also stresses that embracing commonly held European values (i.e. values 
that focus on human rights, the rule of law, and democracy) would aid member states aspiring to 
join the EU because the current member states look for signs of liberal norms.55 The current 
members look for other members that share similar values. They are more likely to support 
expansion if aspiring members have liberal, democratic values in common with the existing 
members. With regards to NATO enlargement, Schimmelfennig makes a similar argument: 
NATO’s member states are the bearer of a set of values and norms that they seek to implement in 
the new member states.56 NATO’s member states have a vision of a European identity that they 
wish to instill in new members. Once NATO and the EU member states asserted their respective 
forms of a European identity or, more generally, a community identity, they were able to assess 
potential member states to see if they fit in the European identity model or not.  
The concept of identity is particularly important for expansion. Tyler Curley argues “the 
development of a national identity in relation to Europe is the most significant contributing factor to 
a policy to support/oppose expanding the EU to include applicant countries.”57 Curley’s research 
also indicates that “the stronger a member identifies with the group, the less likely they are to 
support the inclusion of an outsider.”58 Consequently, aspiring member states have to align their 
national identity as closely as possible to the identity displayed by the current member states if they 
harbor ambitions of eventual accession. Concerns about whether or not a state is sufficiently 
European or sufficiently attached to the European identity could easily end a state’s membership 
appeal. NATO and EU member states look for states that will share their interests so that way the 
newly admitted states can integrate into each institution with ease. If member states see potential 
members beginning to partake in the European identity, then they will be more likely to enlarge so !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55 Schimmelfennig, “The Double Puzzle of EU Enlargement,” 11.  
56 Schimmelfennig, “NATO’s Enlargement to the East: An Analysis of Collective Decision-making,” 12.  
57 Tyler M. Curley, “Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion,” International Studies Quarterly 53 (2009): 649.  
58 Ibid, 652.  
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they can continue to spread and implement liberal norms and values. If and when both institutions 
do enlarge, the hope is that the new member states will fully adopt the European identity and 
strengthen it as the membership process is solidified.  
 Continuing the discussion about the importance of enlargement, Risse-Kappen believes that 
“the security dilemma is almost absent among democracies.”59 In other words, democracies rarely 
engage in warfare with each other so adding new democratic members will increase security on the 
European continent and in the North Atlantic region more generally. If NATO and the EU’s current 
member states see commonalities in their democratic political systems with aspiring member states, 
they will view those states as potential allies and future partners in both organizations. Since NATO 
(after the end of the Cold War and fueled by its member states) is based on a commitment to 
democratic principles,60 continuous enlargement will make Europe more secure. Once NATO and 
the EU enlarge, its member states can actively spread democratic values to the new states that are 
then required to submit to democratic governance. As soon as the member states’ vision of a 
European identity matches up with the potential member states’ visions, then enlargement will 
ensue, driven by the current member states in each organization.  
  
These three perspectives on member state interests offer the following hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 1: The EU and NATO expanded because member state preferences (both material and 
non-material) spurred both institutions to enlarge.   
Hypothesis 1(a): Member states sought to spread a European identity and European norms 
and values to new members. 
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Hypothesis 1(b): Member states sought to add new members in order to increase their own 
material power (economic and military).    
Hypothesis 1(c): Member states sought to add new members in response to domestic 
pressures and interests. 
 
Institutional Interests  
Constructivism 
Although some scholars focus on member states and their interests, others stress that 
institutions are viable actors in their own right. From a constructivist perspective, Barnett and 
Finnemore emphasize, “international organizations (IOs) possess authority”61 and are “autonomous 
actors” that can exercise power in world politics.62 Therefore, institutions are not relegated to 
simply following orders from the member states, but instead are able also to express their own 
interests as international actors. According to this view, NATO and the EU are therefore capable of 
acting on their own, pursuing enlargement, and convincing their members to adopt their interests. 
Even though member states may ultimately make enlargement decisions, NATO and the EU can 
temper their interests and desires. Ultimately, the EU and NATO decide to enlarge in order to 
spread a communal identity that includes liberal democratic norms and values.63 Member states and 
institutions alike emphasize a European identity and believe that spreading that identity is critical to 
the work of each institution. Since NATO and the EU have each established their own political 
community, they want to expand to invite other like-minded members to join. According to 
Schimmelfennig, NATO also seeks to spread its liberal democratic values and norms to new 
members especially once the Cold War ended. Prior to the end of the Cold War, though, the EU and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics (Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University Press, 2004), 5.  
62 Ibid, 3.  
63 Thomas, “The Construction of Europe: Communal Identity and the Politics of EU Enlargement,” 252. 
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NATO did not emphasize respect for human rights, the presence of a market economy, or liberal 
democratic governance in prospective member states. Once the Cold War ended, though, “the 
structural precondition for NATO’s decision to admit those CEECs that had made the greatest 
progress in liberal democratic transformation” became the rule. 64 Although member states can 
affect enlargement, the institution has significant power.  
This institutional power, according to Finnemore, can originate from member states 
themselves. As states continue to pour energy and resources into institutions “to ensure that these 
organizations actually do their job, [they have] expanded the size and scope of most international 
institutions far beyond the intention of their creators.”65 Finnemore also contends that institutions 
have influence over member states, too.66 When the member states give power to institutions, the 
institutions may use that influence to persuade members to see things their way. Because the states 
have granted the institution legitimacy, the institution can use its new credibility to convince 
member states to support it. Finnemore argues that institutions have the power to reach into member 
states’ domestic constituencies in an effort to build support for their agendas.67  
When institutionalization deepens and institutions’ power becomes more far-reaching, the 
institutions themselves evolve into an alternative to the member states as the authoritative bodies in 
international affairs.68 With more institutionalization comes more power to “construct new goals for 
actors…which become accepted by publics and leaders.”69 As institutions construct new goals for 
their members, they also develop their own agendas and mandates that do not depend exclusively 
on member state input.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Though the realist arguments maintain that institutions cannot act unless they are 
specifically guided to do so by the member states, Finnemore’s arguments reveal that greater 
institutionalization allows institutions to consolidate their influence so that they can affect the 
international community even if decision-making capacity ultimately rests (as it does with EU and 
NATO enlargement) with member states. In addition, the fact that NATO and the EU have endured 
for the length of time that they have underscores the notion that there is “extensive 
institutionalization and an extraordinarily high level of commitment on the part of their members.”70 
When the EU and NATO wish to expand, they move through institutional channels to decide 
whether or not to enlarge. Member states are allowed a voice, but the institution guides the final 
decisions. Both NATO and the EU are competent actors on the international stage and make 
decisions about enlargement while considering institutional interests. 
Daniel Thomas also takes on the constructivist perspective when discussing EU 
enlargement. He argues, “The desire…to join the EU is fuelled by a strong sense of identification 
with liberal democratic values that are fundamental to the EU, namely rule of law, social and 
political pluralism, private property, and free speech.”71 Thomas emphasizes that norms of the 
European political community have not remained stagnant and are instead subject to evolutionary 
forces.72 The institutions themselves are responsible for creating the new European political 
community and identity. Over time, the member states adopt the identity and new member states are 
admitted based on whether or not they have successfully adopted the identity. Once again, the end 
of the Cold War signified a necessary recalculation in what states were ready for membership and 
what states needed to undergo certain internal readjustments prior to admission. Although the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
70 Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste A. Wallender, Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time 
and Space (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 47.  
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criteria for membership in the EU has become more pronounced and clearly articulated with the 
Copenhagen criteria, the EU still looks to expansion as a means to include states that already share 
its liberal values and norms.73 Risse-Kappen adds to this point by explaining how sharing in the 
European collective identity of liberal values and norms can boost aspiring member states in the 
eyes of the institution.74 According to Risse-Kappen, institutions help to create these collective and 
shared identities in the first place.75 Institutions focus on building a community identity in new 
member states before they are admitted. Now that institutions have power that the member states 
grant them, the institutions have more control over how enlargement decisions are made.  
If states already demonstrate progress in the area of liberal democratization, both the EU and 
NATO would be more likely to accept their applications for membership. If states appeared weak 
on liberal democratization, NATO and the EU believed that as institutions they could help to spread 
democratic values so that the potential member states would become “peace-loving democracies.” 
After demonstrating evidence of some democratic governance and subsequent admission to either 
or both institutions as a result, the member states would (at least NATO and the EU hoped they 
would) continue to adopt the liberal democratic values that have become a hallmark of both 
organizations. As long as states display a commitment to implementing liberal democratic values (a 
key criteria component for membership), then NATO and the EU tend to favor granting 
membership. NATO and the EU also favor enlargement to expand the European community. In 
order to bring together the various explanations for enlargement processes in both NATO and the 
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EU, Fierke emphasizes that the two institutions have identities themselves and that those identities 
continue to take on new social and political meaning.76  
 
Neoliberalism 
While constructivists focus on institutions’ power of persuasion and non-material interests, 
neoliberal arguments explaining NATO and EU expansion look to aligning material interest-based 
explanations for enlargement. The neoliberal argument describes the “constellation of interests” that 
link member states together and help to form a cohesive institution.77 Neoliberals further emphasize, 
“states are able to realize common interests through cooperation and use international institutions to 
this end.”78 According to Keohane, NATO and the EU are institutionally strong because their 
member states “share common social values and have similar political systems.”79 Therefore, the 
European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will continue to expand as long as 
potential member states display similar interests as the current member states.   
 Espousing the neoliberal perspective, Keohane makes clear that institutions create stability 
and balance in global politics and have the appropriate power to do so.80 He argues that the safest 
course in international affairs is to follow institutional guidelines. “Even powerful states have an 
interest, most of the time, in following the rules of well-established international institutions, since 
general conformity to rules makes the behavior of other states more predictable.”81 Neoliberals 
believe that operating under the same set of rules that the institution puts forth will allow states to 
live in peace and avoid conflict. States understand that if they expect others to follow the rules, then !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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they must do so as well. Consequently, institutions help to provide the necessary stability so that 
states can cooperate and live by the same rules.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The EU and NATO expanded in response to their institutional interests (both 
material and non-material).   
Hypothesis 2(a): Each institution sought to spread a European identity and European norms 
and values to new members.  
Hypothesis 2(b): Each institution sought to add new members in order to affirm its own 
institutional agenda and mandate.  
 
Methods  
 Despite the amount of literature that has been generated on the subject, most authors neglect 
to carefully analyze whether states that were admitted to both the EU and NATO were qualified to 
be members in the first place. Scholars writing about enlargement typically either did not address 
whether or not institutional membership criteria was satisfied or assume that states met all of the 
membership qualifications before their accession without examining the empirical evidence. This 
thesis will look at the membership criteria for each wave of enlargement for both NATO and the EU 
to determine if the admitted states were ready for accession based on the criteria. In order to find 
evidence of gaps in membership criteria, I will look at progress reports from NATO and the 
European Commission, examine accession treaties and protocols, and enter data for democracy, 
human rights, respect for minority populations, and economic liberalization for each new member 
state at the time of accession. For each criteria component, I will examine statistical measures of 
states’ fulfillment of membership criteria, then focus on cases from three different enlargement 
waves for each organization. After obtaining results from my empirical analysis, I will argue that 
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NATO and the EU proceeded with enlargement in order to increase the existing member states’ 
security while spreading liberal norms and values. I am pairing each admitted state with another 
state that was vying for membership at the same time, but was ultimately not admitted. This 
comparison will allow me to examine why certain states were admitted and others were not.  
In order to examine NATO and EU enlargement since both organizations’ initiation, I will 
look at case studies of countries admitted before the Cold War ended in 1991 and after the Cold 
War ended. Among these cases, I will look at case studies of countries that in hindsight may have 
submitted flawed membership applications for consideration to NATO and the EU while also 
considering countries that presented more complete applications based on my analysis in Chapter 2. 
My three case study chapters include Spain, Poland/Hungary, and Romania. Spain was admitted to 
both organizations before the Cold War’s end while Poland, Hungary, and Romania acceded 
afterwards. Examining a case of state accession before the Cold War ended and three cases after it 
ended will allow me to investigate how enlargement evolved over time and what impact, if any, the 
Cold War had on membership decisions. Since the thesis focuses on why new member states were 
admitted despite failing to fulfill basic membership criteria, I will compare cases of states that 
arguably did not fulfill key membership criteria with cases that did fulfill the criteria and were 
quickly admitted (i.e. the United Kingdom). NATO and the EU seem to behave irrationally since 
they occasionally admitted states that have weak membership applications. I will ask the question of 
why the EU and NATO still admit such states and, if incomplete membership qualifications are 
present, what effect does this have on each institution?  
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Case Selection 
 My first case study is Spain. Spain acceded to NATO in 1982 and the EU in 1986.82 In more 
recent years, NATO membership typically precedes EU membership, but EU membership tends to 
follow shortly after NATO accession. In Spain’s case, there is some question as to whether it was 
even ready to be admitted. For NATO, Spain’s strategic location and readiness to contribute to the 
burgeoning military alliance convinced NATO to accept Spain as a permanent member while the 
EU was much more wary given Spain’s military dictatorship under Franco.83 If Spain was troubled 
politically and democratically, how did it still manage to become a member of two organizations 
that claim to value democratic principles and governance? Montero, Gunther, and Torcal argue that 
democratic consolidation in Spain has encountered numerous problems over the years and Spain 
does not appear to have evolved into a complete democratic system that is up to NATO and the 
EU’s usual standards.84  
Given Spain’s dictatorial history, it is possible that Spain’s transition to a democratic system 
will take more time and effort than it would for other states that do not share a similar history. 
Spain’s history of a military dictatorship adds a layer of complexity to the accession procedures that 
will be interesting to investigate. Moreover, Spain’s current financial situation provides on 
opportunity to reflect on whether or not Spain was ever ready to be a member of NATO and the EU 
since its now-weak economic credentials have undermined the power of the EU’s euro. By focusing 
on Spain as the first study, I can look at Cold War enlargement, broadly speaking. Because Spain 
developed differently than other European countries during the twentieth century, it presents an 
interesting and compelling case study.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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 In order to investigate enlargement after the Cold War ended, I will look at Poland and 
Hungary next. Poland and Hungary both joined NATO in 1999 and the EU in 2004.85 Since these 
two states were previously behind the Iron Curtain, but sought to join institutions that originated in 
Western Europe, they serve as a link between the Cold War and European integration. Moreover, 
Poland and Hungary represent compelling cases because they underwent democratization with 
significant assistance from external agents that were affiliated with the international community at 
large as well as with NATO and the EU.86 Prior to their admission to the NATO and the EU, much 
uncertainty surrounded their ability to muster the economic credentials required for membership by 
both organizations.87 Questions about Poland’s ability to contribute to NATO’s military strength 
intensified as the accession process continued. Hungary faced questions about its respect for 
minority groups. Given the complex nature of Poland and Hungary’s membership applications, 
further investigation is called for in order to determine why both states were still admitted if they 
did not meet all of the membership criteria.  
 My final case study is Romania. Romania acceded to NATO in 2004 and the EU in 2007.88 
Currently, Romania is one of the more troubled members in both NATO and the EU given its 
tentative adherence to democratic governance and lack of transparency in its judicial system. Both 
NATO and the EU have criticized Romania for state corruption. Spendzharova and Vachudova 
stress that Romania continues to struggle with “corruption, judicial quality, and state capacity.”89 
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Further, EU and NATO officials have revealed their concern about trafficking in human beings, 
police violence, and violations of the rights of persons with disabilities in Romania that were not 
necessarily resolved before Romania entered NATO and the EU.90 As with Poland, Romania was 
once behind the Iron Curtain. Its floundering adherence to respecting minority groups and liberal 
democratic governance calls into question whether or not it fulfilled the qualifications for 
membership before it was admitted to each organization. With the case study of Romania, I will 
again look at why NATO and the EU accepted a member state that appeared to have not fulfilled all 
of the qualifications for membership. 
 
Overview of Thesis  
Although NATO and the EU both focus on enlargement and European security, little has 
been written on the relationship between the two enlargement processes. I seek to answer the 
question of why institutions enlarge, especially two institutions that share a common history and 
continent despite new members’ inability to meet membership criteria in practice. In Chapter 2, I 
will work through the phases of enlargement for each organization and at the membership criteria 
for each phase. With each wave of enlargement, I will examine whether new members met stated 
criteria or not. Once I have done so, I will begin to explain motivations for enlargement that concern 
both organizations by conducting in-depth case studies. Since NATO and the EU have separate 
objectives and missions, it is necessary to look at both organizations independently and also look 
into how they play on the same team when it comes to securing the European continent either 
financially, economically, militarily, or otherwise.  
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 Before I begin to go through my three case studies, I will examine the membership criteria 
that NATO and the EU put forth before the end of the Cold War and after the end of the Cold War. I 
will cover the terms of NATO’s Washington Treaty, the EU’s Treaty of Rome, the EU’s 
Copenhagen Criteria, and NATO’s 1995 Study on Enlargement with regard to enlargement policies. 
Since the first two documents were written during the Cold War and the last two were written in the 
post-Cold War era, a careful consideration of all four documents will help to formulate my answer 
to what the membership qualifications were and whether or not member states fulfilled them. I will 
look at the different waves of enlargement and examine statistical measures of membership criteria 
in new members to determine if states were sufficiently prepared (according to the membership 
criteria) to join NATO and the EU. In particular, I will focus on post-Cold War enlargement while 
analyzing human rights violations, democratic governance, respect for minority populations, and the 
strength of market economies in all of the countries that entered NATO and the EU. I will argue that 
enlargement proceeded despite the potential risks and the questions of candidates’ readiness to 
accede because institutional and member state interests aligned in favor of expansion. Further, the 
desire to spread liberal norms and values to new member states spurred enlargement. The next 
chapter will look at the membership criteria over time. I will provide measurements for all of the 
criteria and assess whether states met the criteria or not when they joined NATO and/or the EU.   
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Chapter 2: Did States Meet the Criteria? 
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Introduction 
 Although both NATO and the EU anticipated institutional expansion when they wrote their 
original founding documents, neither institution established official membership criteria until the 
1990s. Instead, during the Cold War, each organization relied on informal criteria and other 
informal requirements to determine states’ readiness for membership. Once the Cold War ended, 
both organizations acknowledged that if enlargement was to proceed smoothly and effectively, the 
institutions would need clear expectations so that the expansion process would be transparent. In 
this chapter, I will look at NATO and EU membership criteria during the Cold War and in the post-
Cold War era. After I determine what criteria (official or unofficial) applied for each organization 
during the Cold War and after, I will examine statistical measures of states’ fulfillment of the 
membership criteria. For each variable that I use, I will explain how the variable can be measured 
and interpreted to determine if basic membership qualifications were met at the time of accession. 
The methodology section of this chapter will detail how I selected the data sources. I will also 
explain the data that each source provides. Once I assess the data, I will provide an analysis of 
whether states fulfilled the membership criteria.  
 The EU and NATO both attempted to restore a sense of unity and stability to the European 
continent whether it was in the form of collective security or economic integration. Ultimately, 
though, the two organizations were interested in bringing Europe together. In 1949, NATO emerged 
as the leading military alliance in Europe and the EU followed shortly thereafter with the ambition 
of creating economic unity. It is curious that each organization was relatively vague in its initial 
description of how enlargement would proceed. The Cold War’s end gave the two institutions an 
opportunity to clarify how states could pursue membership and how the institutions would evaluate 
the membership applications. The EU, followed soon after by NATO, established the Copenhagen 
Criteria and NATO published its Study on Enlargement. Both organizations were ready to 
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objectively analyze new states’ bids for membership. Even though NATO and the EU now had 
official membership criteria, the question remains: did some states not fulfill all of the criteria and 
still acceded? This chapter will seek to answer that question.  
 
Methodology 
For the purpose of comparing NATO and EU membership requirements, I will look at the 
following variables: democracy, respect for human rights, respect for minority rights, and the 
strength of economic liberalization in each acceding state. Each organization also has several 
distinct elements of the membership criteria; those differences will be measured and explained as 
well. For example, the EU also requires that states be prepared to cope with the market forces in the 
Union, respect human rights, and have the ability to fulfill the obligations of membership (contained 
in the acquis).91 NATO, on the other hand, requires that new members demonstrate a commitment 
to the peaceful resolution of conflicts, contribute to the military alliance’s operations, and commit to 
democratic civil-military relations.92 In this chapter, I will look at measurements for democracy, 
minority rights, and economic liberalization for both NATO and the EU. I will then look at the 
separate criteria for each organization.  
The EU defines democracy in its 1993 Copenhagen Criteria as including “stable institutions 
[and] the rule of law.”93 In 1995, NATO indicated that aspiring member states must have a 
“functioning democratic political system.”94 The Polity IV variable, which is used to measure 
institutionalized democracy, looks at national institutions, the presence or absence of control over 
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an executive’s power, and whether or not citizens are guaranteed their civil liberties.95 Since the 
Polity IV variable looks at institutionalized democracy, it assesses whether states have incorporated 
institutions that support democracy in civil society and measures if these institutions contribute to a 
functioning democratic political system. Munck and Verkuilen further explain that the Polity IV 
data assesses the “competitiveness of participation, regulation of participation, competitiveness of 
executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, and constraints on executive.”96 Thus, the 
variable explores whether the state is governed by the rule of law. Rule of law suggests that states 
have institutionalized democracy and can inspire public confidence in their institutions. Polity IV 
scores range from 0-10. States that score a 10 have a fully institutionalized democracy, which would 
be in line with the EU and NATO’s expectations.97  
Although Munck and Verkuilen stress the many factors that the Polity IV variable takes into 
consideration, they also point out that Polity IV neglects to measure levels of political participation 
and does not adequately cover how the right to vote was acquired in different countries.98 In spite of 
the absence of a political participation measurement within Polity IV, Polity IV provides a measure 
of democracy that is most closely related to the EU’s and NATO’s own definition because it 
focuses on measuring democratic institutions’ efficacy and monitors the development of rule of law 
in new member states. Polity IV also measures constraints on the executive and the balance of 
power, which the EU and NATO support in newly acceding states. This measure will be helpful in 
determining if new members can create the functioning democratic political system that NATO 
looks for; if states have a functioning democratic political system, then they can more easily 
contribute to the liberal, democratic identity that the institutions desire.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
95 Monty Marshall, Keith Jaggers, Ted Gurr, “Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-
2010: Dataset Users’ Manual,” Center for Systematic Peace (2010): 2.  
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98 Ibid, 11.  
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The human rights measurement is taken from data coded by CIRI. I will use CIRI’s physical 
integrity rights index. CIRI looks at torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and 
disappearance indicators in order to assess how states score on protection of physical integrity 
rights.99 For the CIRI variable, scores range from 0 (several instances of the above violations of 
rights) to 8 (the government respects citizens’ rights).100 The Political Terror Scale (PTS) also 
measures physical integrity rights on a scale from 1 (rule of law prevails, citizens are secure) to 5 
(terror and violations of rights abound, citizens are insecure and lack trust in government).101 Even 
though PTS codes data on human rights, the concern is that the difference between a score of 4 and 
a score of 5 might be vast.102 Because CIRI’s scale is bigger, it is more likely to pick up the nuances 
in human rights abuses that PTS is not able to capture. 103 Therefore, I will use CIRI to measure 
human rights.104 
In order to measure states’ respect for minority populations, which is a recent requirement 
for EU and NATO membership, I will use data from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset, which 
provides two measures of governmental political and economic discrimination against minority 
groups. 105  First, political discrimination against minorities is coded on a scale from 0 (no 
discrimination) to 4 (governmental policies restrict the minority group’s political participation).106 
Second, economic discrimination against minorities is coded on a scale from 0 (no discrimination) 
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to 4 (governmental policies restrict the minority group’s economic opportunities).107 Even though 
MAR provides several measures of minority rights, discrimination, and governmental repression, it 
is based on a “limited sample” of countries108 and does not cover all of the European countries that 
acceded to NATO and the EU. Moreover, its data coverage begins in 1950 and stops in 2006, but it 
still provides a useful indication of minority status and rights in countries that applied to join both 
NATO and the EU in the years leading up to 2006. However, because NATO and the EU did not 
have an explicit requirement for human rights during Cold War enlargement, I will use CIRI’s data 
beginning with the EU’s 1995 wave of enlargement.  
 The next variable is a measure of economic liberalization and the strength of the market 
economy. For data coverage from 1998-2009, I will use the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development’s (EBRD’s) measures of price liberalization, competition policy, trade and foreign 
exchange system, and large-scale privatization in order to assess if each acceding state’s economy 
had evolved into a market economy by the time of accession.109 Price liberalization is scored on a 
scale from 1 (government controls pricing) to 4+ (the country has reached the level of an advanced 
industrial economy).110 Competition policy is also measured on a scale from 1 (little to no economic 
competition) to 4+ (effective control and enforcement of competition policy).111 The trade and 
foreign exchange system is measured on a scale of 1 (excessive import and export controls) to 4+ 
(WTO membership, virtually no tariff barriers).112 Finally, large-scale privatization is on a scale 
from 1 (little private ownership) to 4+ (75% of assets are in private ownership).113 These four 
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factors are all critical in developing a market economy. By measuring each state’s progress in these 
four areas over the course of the five years leading up to accession, I can best determine if states 
had sufficiently cultivated economic liberalization to be considered a market economy by EU and 
NATO standards. Since the EBRD listed four key elements of a market economy (price 
liberalization, competition policy, trade and foreign exchange system, and large-scale privatization), 
it provides the most comprehensive coverage of economic development in a new market economy. 
The EBRD’s coverage starts in 1994 with its first transition report and continues through 2011.114 
Both the EU and NATO did not start to look at economic credentials until 1993 (for the EU) and 
1995 (for NATO). Therefore, the EBRD provides economic data and measures that are relevant for 
the more recent waves of enlargement (from 1995 onward).  
 Diverging from the EU, NATO has three other requirements for membership: military 
contributions, democratic civil-military relationships in society, and the peaceful resolution of 
conflict. NATO’s membership criteria states that new members must have “the ability and 
willingness to make a military contribution to NATO operations [as well as] as a commitment to 
democratic civil-military relations and institutional structures.” 115  To measure military 
contributions, I will use data from the World Bank, which measures military expenditures as a 
percent of GDP. NATO requires that its members dedicate 2% of GDP towards defense spending so 
that the alliance can maintain its defense capabilities and strengthen the military relationship 
between the member states.116 Since the new 1995 criteria, NATO has required the 2% target.117 I 
will look at military expenditures as a percent of GDP for all states admitted to NATO after 1995. If 
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new members are meeting the 2% of GDP target, then they will have met this institutional 
requirement for membership. The World Bank provides data on military expenditures as a percent 
of GDP beginning in 1988. Because NATO’s new 1995 criteria requires a contribution to the 
organization’s defense, data stretching back to 1988 will be more than sufficient for the purposes of 
measuring states’ readiness to accede for this particular criteria component.  
In order to measure democratic civil-military relationships in society, I will use data from 
the Political Risk Services (PRS). PRS measures military in politics. Because the military’s 
involvement in politics suggests governmental ineffectiveness and lack of democratic 
accountability,118 a high military in politics score is concerning. Military in politics is measured on a 
scale from 0 (military is in control of civil society) to 6 (military is completely divorced from 
politics).119 PRS data goes back to 1985 and NATO’s criteria does not include democratic civil-
military relationships until 1995 so PRS has coverage for the years leading up to the first wave of 
post-Cold War NATO enlargement.  
NATO’s Study on Enlargement states that new members must resolve conflicts peacefully 
“in accordance with OSCE principles.”120 If states applying for membership in NATO are already 
members of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), then these states are 
in compliance with OSCE principles and have satisfied the peaceful resolution of conflicts 
requirement for NATO membership. In the next section, I will look at whether NATO member 
states were also members of the OSCE before they joined the military alliance.  
In summary, I will provide measurements for the following variables for both NATO and 
the EU: democracy, respect for minority populations, and economic liberalization. For EU !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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membership, I will look at whether states were prepared to take on the obligations of membership 
according to the institution. I will also look at human rights scores in aspiring EU members. For 
NATO membership, I will look at measures of military contributions, democratic civil-military 
relationships, and whether states were committed to the peaceful resolution of conflicts as 
demonstrated by OSCE membership. In the next section, I will look at years of accession and then 
examine NATO and EU membership criteria during the Cold War. After that, I will look at 
membership criteria in the post-Cold War era.  
 
Years of Accession for NATO and EU Enlargement 
Table 2.1 (NATO and EU Waves of Enlargement) provides the years of accession for states 
that joined NATO and the EU. Not all of the states are members of each organization. The table can 
be found on the next page (page 44).  
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Table 2.1- NATO and EU Waves of Enlargement 
Country Year of NATO Accession Year of EU Accession 
Turkey 1952 Not a member 
Greece 1952 1981 
Germany 1955 Original Member 
United Kingdom Original Member 1973 
Ireland Original Member 1973 
Denmark Original Member 1973 
Portugal Original Member 1986 
Spain 1982 1986 
Austria Not a member 1995 
Finland Not a member 1995 
Sweden Not a member 1995 
Czech Republic 1999 2004 
Poland 1999 2004 
Hungary 1999 2004 
Estonia 2004 2004 
Cyprus 2004 2004 
Latvia 2004 2004 
Lithuania 2004 2004 
Malta 2004 2004 
Slovakia 2004 2004 
Slovenia 2004 2004 
Bulgaria 2004 2007 
Romania 2004 2007 
Albania 2009 Not a member 
Croatia 2009 2013 
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NATO Cold War Accession Criteria  
NATO (and the EU) did not have specific membership criteria during the Cold War, but 
did have some informal requirements. However, NATO did not have informal requirements for 
membership when it admitted Turkey, Greece, and West Germany in the 1950s. On the other 
hand, before Spain joined the alliance in 1982, NATO did implement an informal criteria 
component: the need for new members to have a democracy. In the next section, I will look at 
Spain’s democratic development as it prepared for membership.  
Although NATO and the EU (then the European Community or the EC) both emerged 
after the end of World War II, they had separate purposes and developed different expectations 
for aspiring members. NATO’s 1949 Washington Treaty sought to establish basic membership 
procedures for each organization. As enlargement became more of central institutional focus 
after the Cold War, NATO designed more specific membership qualifications in order to 
streamline the accession negotiations. For the Cold War enlargement, though, NATO adhered to 
very basic criteria.  
NATO was established in 1949 as a formal military alliance between the U.S. and its 
Western allies. In NATO’s 1949 Washington Treaty, Article 10 covers the topic of enlargement. 
Article 10 states the following:  
“The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position 
to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North 
Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the 
Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United 
States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of 
the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.”121  
 
Article 10 makes clear that aspiring members must be European states, must be in a position to 
support the objectives of the treaty, and must be able to contribute to North Atlantic security. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
121 “The North Atlantic Treaty,” http://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/pdf/nato_treaty_en_light.pdf, Accessed: 13 
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NATO was principally concerned with extending the security umbrella across the European 
continent, the front line in the Cold War against the Soviet Union as the Cold War was getting 
underway. Strategic positions and the balance of power, not democracy or human rights, were 
key for NATO during the Cold War.  
Article 10 does require that new members “contribute to the security of the North 
Atlantic area,” which NATO assesses in each of the protocols with the new members; this 
assessment will be explained in the next section. Article 10 also highlights the United States’ 
critical role in enlargement since new members must deposit their instruments of accession with 
the U.S. government. Until the end of the Cold War, Article 10 was the authority on enlargement 
proceedings. Thus, for the first three waves of NATO enlargement (1952, 1955, and 1982), the 
organization looked to the Washington Treaty to determine whether aspiring members could 
join. The current member states looked to their strategic interests and the institution did the same 
when deciding on enlargement.  
 
NATO Cold War Accession in Practice 
Turkey and Greece acceded to NATO in 1952, West Germany acceded in 1955, and 
Spain acceded in 1982.122 Three waves of enlargement all took place before the Cold War ended. 
The only thing the institution looked for in new members in the 1950s was their ability to 
contribute to collective security in the North Atlantic region (Spain, on the other hand, had to be 
a democracy and able to contribute to security before it could join). In the individual protocols 
that NATO signed with Turkey, Greece, West Germany, and Spain, the institution declared that 
all four states were poised to contribute to increasing security in the North Atlantic. Before Spain !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
122 “NATO Enlargement,” last modified 1 April 2009, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm, Date 
Accessed: 30 September 2012. 
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acceded, though, NATO incorporated a new, informal requirement: democracy. The democratic 
requirement was not included in the Washington Treaty, but the North Atlantic Council (NAC) 
made clear that Spain would not be admitted without a democracy in place.123 Table 2.2 
(Democracy in Spain) lists Spain’s scores on the Polity IV scale.  
Table 2.2- Democracy in Spain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysis of 1982 NATO Enlargement 
Spain’s score of 10 on Polity IV suggests the presence of a fully institutionalized 
democracy within the country.124 Spain even scored higher on the Polity IV scale than the NATO 
average. Therefore, Spain satisfied NATO’s democracy requirement and met the contributing to 
collective security requirement as well. According to the membership criteria at the time, 
Turkey, West Germany, Greece, and Spain all fulfilled NATO’s expectations before acceding.  
 
EC Cold War Accession Criteria   
 The European Community, in contrast, was formed in 1957 with the purpose of creating 
economic integration on the European continent. The EC’s 1957 Treaty of Rome laid out the 
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Country Year Democracy: Polity IV 
Spain 1978 9 
Spain 1979 9 
Spain 1980 9 
Spain 1981 9 
Spain 1982 10 
NATO Average 1982 9.08 
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criteria for membership, which was not very explicit. Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome explains 
the criteria for enlargement: 
“Any European State may apply to become a member of the Community. It shall address 
its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after obtaining the opinion of 
the Commission. The conditions of admission and the adjustments to this Treaty 
necessitated thereby shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member States and 
the applicant State. This agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all the 
Contracting States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.”125 
 
Much like NATO’s initial requirements, the EC emphasized that other European states were 
welcome to join the Community. NATO required that new states “further the principles of the 
treaty,” while the EC underscored the importance of member states’ involvement in the decision-
making process. According to the EC Treaty of Rome, the membership agreement is between the 
member states and the applicant state.126 This suggests a case-by-case decision-making process 
that guided enlargement in the European Community until the Cold War ended. Member states 
would carefully consider each application and render a decision based on that individual case.  
Like NATO, the EU produced clear membership criteria after the end of the Cold War. 
Although the EC’s Treaty of Rome criteria was relatively vague, the institution clarified that 
democracy was an unofficial criteria component for the Cold War enlargement cases. In 1962, 
the EC issued the Birkelbach Report, which made clear that states must have democratically 
legitimated governments before the EC would grant them membership.127 Since the EC had 
never had a non-democratic member nor relations with a non-liberal government, the institution 
decided to make democracy contingent on a membership offer.128 For the EC’s 1973, 1981, and 
1986 waves of enlargement, democracy was, therefore, an informal requirement. After the Cold !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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War, the EC (now the EU) made democracy an explicit criteria component. I will look at 
democracy scores for all of the states admitted to the EC after 1962 (the UK, Denmark, Ireland, 
Greece, Spain, and Portugal). I will now go through the waves of Cold War enlargement for the 
EC/EU, highlight the data, and determine whether or not states were prepared for membership 
according to the criteria at the time, which was minimal and very informal. 
 
EC Cold War Accession in Practice  
Britain, Ireland, and Denmark joined the EC in 1973 while Spain, Portugal, and Greece 
joined in the 1980s.129 The EC did not have codified membership criteria in place for the 1973, 
1981, and 1986 waves of enlargement besides what the Treaty of Rome’s Article 237 referred to 
in terms of enlargement. In addition to Article 237, the EC issued a protocol for each wave of 
enlargement during the Cold War to assess whether states were ready for membership. The 1972 
protocol in advance of the 1973 admission of the UK, Denmark, and Ireland stated the following 
with regards to accession criteria that needed to be met: 
“The new Member States undertake to accede to the conventions provided for in Article 
220 of the EEC Treaty, and to the protocols on the interpretation of those conventions by 
the Court of Justice, signed by the original Member States, and to this end they undertake 
to enter into negotiations with the original Member States in order to make the necessary 
adjustments thereto.”130 
 
The protocols for Greece, Spain, and Portugal’s accession used the same language as the 
1972 protocol. The EC required the states seeking membership during the Cold War to accede to 
the Article 220 conventions and agree to all of the protocols and agreements signed by the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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current member states. I will look at the accession treaties for the UK, Denmark, Ireland, Greece, 
Portugal, and Spain to determine if these states met the requirements that the EC listed in the 
protocols. The accession treaties and protocols from these three waves of enlargement alluded to 
the need to implement the “liberalization of capital movements.”131 I will use International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) reports from the 1970s and 1980s to assess whether the UK, Denmark, 
Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Greece met this requirement when they joined the EC during the 
Cold War era. In addition, the EC’s 1962 Birkelbach report made democracy an informal 
requirement for admission. I will use Polity IV to assess democracy in the states that joined the 
EC in 1973 as well as the states that joined in 1981 and 1986. The next paragraph will address 
the “liberalization of capital movements” in the Cold War applicant states, the following 
paragraph will address whether the EC (in the accession treaties) deemed that the applicants were 
ready for membership, and the last paragraph will look at democracy scores in the acceding 
states.  
According to the IMF, by 1980, Greece had established a secure “exchange control 
policy”132 so it was prepared for EC accession in 1981; the country had liberalized capital flows 
that satisfied the institution. Spain had also established and was monitoring a foreign exchange 
policy so that it could eventually accede to the EC in 1986.133 Finally, Portugal developed its 
own exchange controls in order to meet the EC’s expectation of the liberalization of capital 
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movements.134 The UK, Ireland, and Denmark all worked to pursue the objectives of the EC’s 
economic mission.135  
Since all of the states that acceded before the EU implemented the Copenhagen Criteria 
in 1993, they had to agree to the terms of the EC’s Treaty of Rome, liberalize capital flows, 
implement democratic systems, and accept any previous agreements that the EC member states 
had signed. In 1972, the EC concluded that the UK, Denmark, and Ireland had met all of the 
requirements for membership.136 The 1979 accession treaty between Greece and the EC also 
concluded that Greece had satisfied the requirements for membership.137 Finally, the 1985 
accession treaty brought about Spain and Portugal’s membership in the EC.138 Thus, all six states 
that joined the EC during the Cold War were prepared for membership according to the 
institution’s requirements on liberalization of capital movements and agreeing to the terms of the 
Treaty of Rome as well as other conventions. The next paragraph will look at democracy (a new, 
informal requirement) in the states that acceded during the Cold War.   
After 1962, the EC began to look at states’ level of democratic development before 
granting membership. Table 2.3 (1973 EC Enlargement), Table 2.4 (1981 EC Enlargement), and 
Table 2.5 (1986 EC Enlargement) include data about democracy in the aspiring member states. 
The years of accession and the EC averages for democracy in the year of accession are 
highlighted. The tables can be found on the next page (page 52).  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Table 2.3- 1973 EC Enlargement 
Country Year Democracy: Polity IV 
United Kingdom 1969 10 
United Kingdom 1970 10 
United Kingdom 1971 10 
United Kingdom 1972 10 
United Kingdom 1973 10 
Ireland 1969 10 
Ireland 1970 10 
Ireland 1971 10 
Ireland 1972 10 
Ireland 1973 10 
Denmark 1969 10 
Denmark 1970 10 
Denmark 1971 10 
Denmark 1972 10 
Denmark 1973 10 
EC Average 1973 9.5 
 
Table 2.4- 1981 EC Enlargement\ 
Country Year Democracy: Polity IV 
Greece 1977 8 
Greece 1978 8 
Greece 1979 8 
Greece 1980 8 
Greece 1981 8 
EC Average 1981 9.67 
 
Table 2.5 - 1986 EC Enlargement 
Country Year Democracy: Polity IV 
Spain 1982 10 
Spain 1983 10 
Spain 1984 10 
Spain 1985 10 
Spain 1986 10 
Portugal 1982 10 
Portugal 1983 10 
Portugal 1984 10 
Portugal 1985 10 
Portugal 1986 10 
EC Average 1986 9.89 
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Analysis of 1973, 1981, and 1986 EC Enlargement  
All of the states admitted in the 1973 enlargement wave and the 1986 enlargement wave 
scored a 10 on the Polity IV scale, indicating that they all have fully institutionalized 
democracies. Greece scored an 8 on democracy in the year of accession, which suggests that a 
democracy is still present. As a result, all of the states admitted in 1973, 1981, and 1986 fulfilled 
the requirements for membership in the European Community.  
 
NATO and EU Membership Criteria after the Cold War  
At the Cold War’s end, NATO and the EU clarified the expectations for aspiring 
members so that they were clear, relevant, and compatible with a liberal system of governance. 
NATO and the EU realized that the prospective member states in the post-Cold War era came 
from different political and historical backgrounds than the rest of Western Europe. In order to 
ensure a smooth transition into both organizations, NATO and the EU wanted the new members 
to commit to the same goals and agenda as the respective institution. Establishing membership 
criteria that applied to all new members would make this possible. Moreover, the EU and NATO 
wanted to demonstrate that they were leaders in the democratic, peace-loving world. The EU 
looked at enlargement as a “political necessity and a historic opportunity” that would give the 
institution new opportunities for economic growth and provide greater stability on the European 
continent.139 In order to do this, the institutions needed membership criteria that upheld the 
values of liberal governance. In 1993, the EU agreed to the Copenhagen Criteria, which laid out 
the conditions that must be in place before granting membership. In addition to agreeing to EU 
standards and rules, gaining membership approval from EU institutions and member states, and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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having the support of its national population, an aspiring member state must also fulfill the 
Copenhagen Criteria in order to gain admission into the EU.140 The Copenhagen Criteria requires 
the following:  
“Stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for 
and protection of minorities; a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with 
competition and market forces in the EU; the ability to take on and implement effectively 
the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic, 
and monetary union.”141 
 
Although the EU’s incoming member states typically displayed evidence of all of the 
above requirements (democracy, a market economy, respect for human rights, respect for 
minority rights, and an ability to assume the responsibilities of membership), the EU as an 
institution did not formally require any of these specific components in a membership 
application. The EU’s Copenhagen Criteria applied for all states that were admitted after 1993 
and required all of the above components in a membership application. Committed to integrating 
and uniting Europe, the EU took the initiative to explain how new states should pursue 
membership and satisfy the membership requirements. The EU’s 1995 Madrid Council expanded 
on the role of enlargement in the post-Cold War era. It stressed that enlargement would give the 
EU a sense of stability, security, freedom, and solidarity.142 The Madrid Council reinforced the 
1993 Copenhagen Criteria and included additional arguments in favor of expansion.  
 The EU provided a model from which NATO could base its own membership criteria, 
which it sought to specify at the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Iron Curtain. NATO 
chose to pursue enlargement in order to expand the security architecture in Europe, increase 
stability and the common defense, and build a sense of European cooperation based on shared !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
140 “Conditions for Membership,” http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/index_en.htm, 
Accessed: 13 January 2013.  
141 Ibid.  
142 “Madrid European Council,” European Union (1995), 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00400-C.EN5.htm, Accessed: 5 May 2013. 
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democratic values.143 In 1995, NATO’s Study on Enlargement outlined how future waves of 
enlargement would proceed and established a clear set of criteria for membership. Although 
Article 10 in the Washington Treaty emphasized that new states ought to contribute to security in 
the North Atlantic region, NATO realized that in order to maintain its position as a security 
leader committed to promoting liberal values, it would need to make sure its membership criteria 
matched up with its objectives (i.e. military, strategic, democratic, liberal). The new membership 
criteria requires the following:  
“A functioning democratic political system based on a market economy, the fair 
treatment of minority populations, a commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflicts, 
the ability and willingness to make a military contribution to NATO operations, and a 
commitment to democratic civil-military relations and institutional structures.”144 
 
The above criteria did not become a formal requirement for incoming members until 1995. The 
next section will look at quantitative measures of the membership criteria for both NATO and 
the EU to determine if states met institutional requirements for accession.  
 
Data for Post-Cold War NATO and EU Enlargement   
 Post-Cold War enlargement began in earnest in 1995. Austria, Finland, and Sweden 
acceded to the European Union in 1995 under the terms of the 1993 Copenhagen Criteria.145 The 
EU’s Copenhagen Criteria helped to solidify the qualities that the EU was looking for in 
prospective member states. Table 2.6 (1995 EU Enlargement) includes the membership criteria 
and how each of the three states scored on all of the requirements. The data include the five years 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
143 “Study on NATO Enlargement,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2008), 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_24733.htm, Accessed: 5 May 2013.!!
144 “NATO Enlargement,” http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm, Accessed: 13 January 2013.  
145 “European Enlargement,” last modified 21 July 2011, http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/FSMS/MS1.htm, Date 
Accessed: 30 September 2012. 
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preceding accession as well as the EU average for each measurement in the year of accession. 
Included in the table are measures of democracy, human rights, and respect for minorities.  
 
Table 2.6- 1995 EU Enlargement 
Country Year Democracy- Polity IV 
Human Rights- 
CIRI 
Political Dis- 
MAR 
Economic 
Dis- MAR 
Austria 1991 10 7 . . 
Austria 1992 10 7 . . 
Austria 1993 10 7 . . 
Austria 1994 10 7 . . 
Austria 1995 10 8 . . 
Finland 1991 10 8 . . 
Finland 1992 10 8 . . 
Finland 1993 10 8 . . 
Finland 1994 10 8 . . 
Finland 1995 10 8 . . 
Sweden 1991 10 8 . . 
Sweden 1992 10 8 . . 
Sweden 1993 10 8 . . 
Sweden 1994 10 8 . . 
Sweden 1995 10 8 . . 
EU Average 1995 9.91 7.17 1.4 1.2 
 
 
Analysis of 1995 EU Enlargement: Political and Economic Criteria 
The data in Table 2.5 reveal that Austria, Finland, and Sweden met or exceeded the EU 
averages for democracy and human rights. All three states admitted in this wave were prepared 
to be members and had fulfilled the criteria. There is not a measure for economic liberalization 
for these three states since the EBRD does not cover Western or Northern European states in its 
data. However, prior to accession, Austria, Finland, and Sweden all participated in the European 
Free Trade Agreement (EFTA).146 This suggests that the three states already had close trade 
relations with the EU and were familiar with EU economic affairs so their integration into the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
146 Fritz Breuss, “Austria, Finland, and Sweden in the European Union: Economic Effects,” Austrian Economic 
Quarterly (2003): 131.  
Wall 57 
Union would not be problematic. The EU wanted to deepen economic integration so they looked 
favorably on admitting new members that were already economically advanced like Austria, 
Finland, and Sweden.   
Table 2.7 provides the data for NATO’s first post-Cold War enlargement wave. 
 
Table 2.7- 1999 NATO Enlargement (Political Criteria) 
Country Year Democracy- Polity IV 
Political Dis- 
MAR 
Economic Dis- 
MAR 
Military in 
Politics- PRS 
Military exp. as 
% of GDP- 
World Bank 
Membership 
in OSCE? 
Czech Republic 1995 10 1 1 6 1.84 Yes 
Czech Republic 1996 10 1 1 6 1.73 Yes 
Czech Republic 1997 10 1 1 6 1.66 Yes 
Czech Republic 1998 10 1 1 6 1.83 Yes 
Czech Republic 1999 10 1 1 6 1.94 Yes 
Hungary 1995 10 1 3 6 1.56 Yes 
Hungary 1996 10 1 3 6 1.47 Yes 
Hungary 1997 10 1 3 6 1.69 Yes 
Hungary 1998 10 1 3 6 1.47 Yes 
Hungary 1999 10 1 3 6 1.67 Yes 
Poland 1995 9 . . 6 1.96 Yes 
Poland 1996 9 . . 6 1.97 Yes 
Poland 1997 9 . . 6 2.03 Yes 
Poland 1998 9 . . 6 2.02 Yes 
Poland 1999 9 . . 6 1.92 Yes 
NATO Average 1999 9.79 1.25 1.13 5.5 2.07 
Yes (all NATO 
members are 
also OSCE 
members) 
 
 
Analysis of 1999 NATO Enlargement 
Political Criteria 
Based on the data in Table 2.7, in terms of institutionalized democracy, Poland scored a 
9, which suggests the presence of a strong democracy. Both the Czech Republic and Hungary 
scored a 10 on democracy in 1999 so they also had fully institutionalized democracies. The 
Czech Republic fared well on respect for minorities while Hungary’s score of 3 on economic 
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discrimination implies that minority groups in the country are impoverished and their interests 
are underrepresented.147 All three states had democratic-civil military relations. Even though the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland fell short on defense expenditures, they were close to 
NATO’s 2% target. The most concerning piece of the data is Hungary’s high score (and 
therefore worse score) on economic discrimination against minorities. However, Hungary still 
acceded to NATO in 1999 even though NATO’s new 1995 criteria placed an emphasis on 
respecting minority groups. The question of how and why Hungary still acceded will be taken up 
in Chapter 4. All three states that joined NATO in 1999 did not meet the NATO 2% target. 
Hungary lagged behind the most with only 1.67% of GDP spent on defense. This will also be 
explored further in Chapter 4.  
 Table 2.8 contains the data for the measures of economic liberalization in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Poland. There is not a comparison to the NATO average because the 
EBRD data does not cover data for Western Europe, only Eastern European states.    
Table 2.8- 1999 NATO Enlargement (Economic Criteria)  
Country Year Price liberalization 
Trade/Exchange 
System 
Competition 
Policy 
Large-scale 
Privatization 
Czech Republic 1995 3 4+ 3 4 
Czech Republic 1996 3 4+ 3 4 
Czech Republic 1997 3 4+ 3 4 
Czech Republic 1998 3 4+ 3 4 
Czech Republic 1999 3 4+ 3 4 
Hungary 1995 3 4+ 3 4 
Hungary 1996 3 4+ 3 4 
Hungary 1997 3+ 4+ 3 4 
Hungary 1998 3+ 4+ 3 4 
Hungary 1999 3+ 4+ 3 4 
Poland 1995 3 4+ 3 3 
Poland 1996 3 4+ 3 3 
Poland 1997 3 4+ 3 3+ 
Poland 1998 3+ 4+ 3 3+ 
Poland 1999 3+ 4+ 3 3+ 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
147 Minorities at Risk, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data/mar_codebook_Feb09.pdf, Accessed: 8 February 2013.!!
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Economic Criteria  
Scores of three or above suggest that there is some enforcement and implementation of 
liberal economic reforms, but it is still not a consolidated market economy system.148 Poland 
scored a 4+ for its trade and foreign exchange system but did not score a 4 in any of the other 
categories. As a result, Poland’s economic system was not a consolidated market economy by the 
time it acceded to NATO in 1999. NATO requires that states have a fully functional market 
economy and Poland’s scores were below the requisite levels of economic reform. Studies show 
that the emergence of democracy is directly related to the “state of economic development” in a 
given country.149 As Poland continues to strengthen its democracy, then its economy will be on 
the rise as well so this is an encouraging sign for the institution. NATO looked favorably on 
Poland’s accession, believing that Poland’s economy would continue to improve and would be 
an asset to the institution. Poland’s economic issues will be taken up in Chapter 4.   
 Table 2.9 and 2.10 contain the data for the 2004 wave of EU enlargement.150  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
148 “Transition Report Archive,” 
http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/publications/flagships/transition/archive.shtml, Accessed: 1 February 2013. 
149 Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc, 
1960): 48.  
150 The data for 2004 EU Enlargement has been broken up into two tables.  !
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Table 2.9- 2004 EU Enlargement (Political Criteria) 
Part 1 
 
Country Year Democracy- Polity IV 
Human 
Rights- CIRI 
Political Dis- 
MAR 
Economic 
Dis- MAR 
Cyprus 2000 10 7 0 0 
Cyprus 2001 10 7 0 0 
Cyprus 2002 10 7 0 0 
Cyprus 2003 10 7 0 0 
Cyprus 2004 10 7 0 0 
Czech Republic 2000 10 7 1 1 
Czech Republic 2001 10 8 0 0 
Czech Republic 2002 10 8 0 0 
Czech Republic 2003 10 7 0 0 
Czech Republic 2004 10 6 0 0 
Estonia 2000 9 8 0 1 
Estonia 2001 9 7 0 1 
Estonia 2002 9 7 0 1 
Estonia 2003 9 7 0 1 
Estonia 2004 9 7 4 4 
Hungary 2000 10 8 1 3 
Hungary 2001 10 7 1 3 
Hungary 2002 10 7 1 3 
Hungary 2003 10 7 1 3 
Hungary 2004 10 6 1 3 
Latvia 2000 8 7 1 3 
Latvia 2001 8 6 1 3 
Latvia 2002 8 7 1 3 
Latvia 2003 8 7 1 3 
Latvia 2004 8 6 1 3 
EU Average 2004 9.93 7.13 0.83 0.83 
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Table 2.10- 2004 EU Enlargement (Political Criteria) 
Part 2  
 
 
Lithuania 2000 10 7 0 0 
Lithuania 2001 10 6 0 0 
Lithuania 2002 10 7 0 0 
Lithuania 2003 10 7 0 0 
Lithuania 2004 10 7 0 0 
Malta 2000 . . 3 0 
Malta 2001 . 8 3 0 
Malta 2002 . . 3 0 
Malta 2003 . 8 3 0 
Malta 2004 . 8 . . 
Poland 2000 9 6 . . 
Poland 2001 9 7 . . 
Poland 2002 10 8 . . 
Poland 2003 10 7 . . 
Poland 2004 10 6 . . 
Slovakia 2000 9 6 . . 
Slovakia 2001 9 7 . . 
Slovakia 2002 9 7 . . 
Slovakia 2003 9 6 . . 
Slovakia 2004 9 7 1 1 
Slovenia 2000 10 7 . . 
Slovenia 2001 10 8 . . 
Slovenia 2002 10 8 . . 
Slovenia 2003 10 7 . . 
Slovenia 2004 10 7 . . 
EU Average 2004 9.93 7.13 0.83 0.83 
 
 
Analysis of 2004 EU Enlargement 
Political Criteria  
Looking at the data for the 2004 wave of enlargement highlights that the new members 
(as of 2004) satisfied the membership criteria based on their democracy scores. Human rights 
and respect for minority rights proved to be more problematic for some countries. Poland’s score 
of 6 from CIRI indicates that there were isolated instances of torture, extrajudicial killing, 
Country Year Democracy- Polity IV 
Human 
Rights- CIRI 
Political Dis- 
MAR 
Economic 
Dis- MAR 
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political imprisonment, and disappearance within the country.151 Even after five years of NATO 
membership, Poland’s human rights scores were still a little concerning as it approached EU 
membership. Its human rights score dropped from a 7 to a 6 from 2003 to 2004. This decline 
raises some doubts that Poland was ready to join in 2004. In addition, Hungary’s economic 
discrimination scores remained at a 3 from 1999-2004; it was still not fully supportive of 
minority rights. Estonia and Latvia’s scores on political and economic discrimination were also a 
little alarming, which suggests that problems with respecting minority rights were common in 
Central and Eastern Europe and were not confined to one state or another.  
 Table 2.11 and 2.12 include the measures of economic liberalization in the countries that 
acceded to the EU in 2004. Again, there is not a comparison to the EU average available since 
the EBRD does not provide data for Western or Northern European states.  
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151 “CIRI Human Rights Data Project Coding Manual,” 
http://www.humanrightsdata.org/documentation/ciri_coding_guide.pdf, Accessed: 9 February 2013.  
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Table 2.11- 2004 EU Enlargement (Economic Criteria) 
Part 1 
 
Country Year Price liberalization 
Trade/Exchange 
Policy 
Competition 
Policy 
Large-scale 
Privatization 
Cyprus 2000 . . . . 
Cyprus 2001 . . . . 
Cyprus 2002 . . . . 
Cyprus 2003 . . . . 
Cyprus 2004 . . . . 
Czech Republic 2000 3 4+ 3 4 
Czech Republic 2001 3 4+ 3 3+ 
Czech Republic 2002 3 4+ 3 4 
Czech Republic 2003 4+ 4+ 3 4 
Czech Republic 2004 4+ 4+ 3 4 
Estonia 2000 3 4+ 3- 4 
Estonia 2001 3 4+ 3- 3+ 
Estonia 2002 3 4+ 3- 4 
Estonia 2003 4 4+ 3- 4 
Estonia 2004 4+ 4+ 3- 4 
Hungary 2000 3+ 4+ 3 4 
Hungary 2001 3+ 4+ 3 3+ 
Hungary 2002 3+ 4+ 3 4 
Hungary 2003 4+ 4+ 3 4 
Hungary 2004 4+ 4+ 3 4 
Latvia 2000 3 4+ 2+ 3 
Latvia 2001 3 4+ 2+ 3- 
Latvia 2002 3 4+ 2+ 3+ 
Latvia 2003 4+ 4+ 3- 3+ 
Latvia 2004 4+ 4+ 3- 4- 
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Table 2.12- 2004 EU Enlargement (Economic Criteria) 
Part 2  
 
 
Country Year Price liberalization 
Trade/Exchange 
Policy 
Competition 
Policy 
Large-scale 
Privatization 
Lithuania 2000 3 4 3- 3 
Lithuania 2001 3 4+ 3 3- 
Lithuania 2002 3 4+ 3 4- 
Lithuania 2003 4+ 4+ 3 4- 
Lithuania 2004 4+ 4+ 3 4- 
Malta 2000 . . . . 
Malta 2001 . . . . 
Malta 2002 . . . . 
Malta 2003 . . . . 
Malta 2004 . . . . 
Poland 2000 3+ 4+ 2+ 3+ 
Poland 2001 3+ 4+ 3 3+ 
Poland 2002 3+ 4+ 3 3+ 
Poland 2003 4+ 4+ 3 3+ 
Poland 2004 4+ 4+ 3 3+ 
Slovakia 2000 3 4+ 3 4 
Slovakia 2001 3 4+ 3 3 
Slovakia 2002 3 4+ 3 4 
Slovakia 2003 4+ 4+ 3 4 
Slovakia 2004 4+ 4+ 3 4 
Slovenia 2000 3+ 4+ 3- 3 
Slovenia 2001 3+ 4+ 3- 3- 
Slovenia 2002 3+ 4+ 3- 3 
Slovenia 2003 4 4+ 3- 3 
Slovenia 2004 4 4+ 3- 3 
 
Economic Criteria 
As has been the case with the Central and Eastern European states that acceded to NATO 
around the same time, gaps in competition policy seem to be common problems. While scores 
for price liberalization, trade and exchange systems, and large-scale privatization tend to be 
higher, scores for competition policy are comparatively lower. Some of the scores for large-scale 
privatization are also relatively low. For example, Slovenia scored a 3, which suggests the 
presence of some privatization, but the process has not been completed yet and there are 
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unresolved disputes over implementing corporate governance.152 Poland displayed some signs of 
improvement from its NATO accession to its EU accession. For example, in 1999, Poland scored 
a 3+ in trade and exchange policy, but by 2004, its score increased to a 4+ meaning that it had 
removed the majority of its barriers to trade.153 On the other hand, Poland made no progress on 
its competition policy score. That score did not change from 1999 to 2004. Other states admitted 
in the 2004 wave were able to bring their scores up over the course of the five years preceding 
enlargement (i.e. Slovakia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic), which compelled the EU to take 
their accession aspirations seriously.  
 Table 2.13 contains the data for NATO’s 2004 wave of enlargement. The table appears 
on the next page.  
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152 “Transition Report Archive,” 
http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/publications/flagships/transition/archive.shtml, Accessed: 1 February 2013. 
153 Ibid.!!
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Table 2.13- 2004 NATO Enlargement (Political Criteria) 
Country Year Democracy- Polity IV 
Political Dis- 
MAR 
Economic Dis- 
MAR 
Military in 
Politics- PRS 
Military exp. as 
% of GDP- 
World Bank 
Membership in 
OSCE? 
Bulgaria 2000 8 0 3 5 2.72 Yes 
Bulgaria 2001 9 0 3 5 2.93 Yes 
Bulgaria 2002 9 0 3 5 2.85 Yes 
Bulgaria 2003 9 0 3 5 2.75 Yes 
Bulgaria 2004 9 3 1 5 2.57 Yes 
Estonia 2000 9 0 1 5 1.38 Yes 
Estonia 2001 9 0 1 5 1.51 Yes 
Estonia 2002 9 0 1 5 1.67 Yes 
Estonia 2003 9 0 1 5 1.74 Yes 
Estonia 2004 9 4 4 5 1.70 Yes 
Latvia 2000 8 1 3 5 0.89 Yes 
Latvia 2001 8 1 3 5 1.05 Yes 
Latvia 2002 8 1 3 5 1.58 Yes 
Latvia 2003 8 1 3 5 1.69 Yes 
Latvia 2004 8 1 3 5 1.67 Yes 
Lithuania 2000 10 0 0 5 1.70 Yes 
Lithuania 2001 10 0 0 5 1.77 Yes 
Lithuania 2002 10 0 0 5 1.70 Yes 
Lithuania 2003 10 0 0 5 1.70 Yes 
Lithuania 2004 10 0 0 5 1.49 Yes 
Romania 2000 8 . . 5 2.53 Yes 
Romania 2001 8 . . 5 2.45 Yes 
Romania 2002 8 . . 5 2.30 Yes 
Romania 2003 8 . . 5 2.10 Yes 
Romania 2004 9 3 3 5 2.03 Yes 
Slovakia 2000 9 . . 6 1.68 Yes 
Slovakia 2001 9 . . 6 1.87 Yes 
Slovakia 2002 9 . . 6 1.80 Yes 
Slovakia 2003 9 . . 6 1.88 Yes 
Slovakia 2004 9 1 1 6 1.69 Yes 
Slovenia 2000 10 . . 5 1.11 Yes 
Slovenia 2001 10 . . 5 1.32 Yes 
Slovenia 2002 10 . . 5 1.41 Yes 
Slovenia 2003 10 . . 5 1.43 Yes 
Slovenia 2004 10 . . 5 1.46 Yes 
NATO 
Average 2004 9.82 1 1.09 5.61 1.89 
Yes (all NATO 
members are 
also OSCE 
members) 
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Analysis of 2004 NATO Enlargement 
Political Criteria 
The states that joined NATO in 2004 had established democracies. The CIRI data also 
revealed several flaws in the acceding states’ applications. For example, both Bulgaria and 
Romania scored a 5 during the year of accession. A score of 5 on CIRI’s scale suggests limited 
governmental control over and possible participation in torture, extrajudicial killing, political 
imprisonment, and disappearance.154 As with the three states that joined NATO in 1999, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia did not meet the NATO 2% target for defense 
spending. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia still gained admission in 2004 even 
though they did not meet the 2% target.  
Romania scored a 3 based on MAR’s economic discrimination index, which implies that 
minority groups are not always treated with respect and given an equal opportunity to achieve 
economic opportunity as other dominant groups in society.155 The fact that NATO still enlarged 
even where there were indications that Bulgaria and Romania (among others) had not met the 
expectations for membership suggests that other forces at work compelled it to enlarge despite 
the risks. These forces and factors will be explored in the case study chapters.  
 Table 2.14 includes the data for the measures of economic liberalization in the states that 
joined NATO in 2004.  
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154 “CIRI Human Rights Data Project Coding Manual,” 
http://www.humanrightsdata.org/documentation/ciri_coding_guide.pdf, Accessed: 9 February 2013. 
155 Minorities at Risk, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data/mar_codebook_Feb09.pdf, Accessed: 8 February 2013.!
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Table 2.14- 2004 NATO Enlargement (Economic Criteria) 
Country Year Price liberalization 
Trade/Exchange 
Policy 
Competition 
Policy 
Large-scale 
Privatization 
Bulgaria 2000 3 4+ 2+ 4- 
Bulgaria 2001 3 4+ 2+ 2+ 
Bulgaria 2002 3 4+ 2+ 4- 
Bulgaria 2003 4+ 4+ 2+ 4- 
Bulgaria 2004 4+ 4+ 2+ 4 
Estonia 2000 3 4+ 3- 4 
Estonia 2001 3 4+ 3- 3+ 
Estonia 2002 3 4+ 3- 4 
Estonia 2003 4 4+ 3- 4 
Estonia 2004 4+ 4+ 3- 4 
Latvia 2000 3 4+ 2+ 3 
Latvia 2001 3 4+ 2+ 3- 
Latvia 2002 3 4+ 2+ 3+ 
Latvia 2003 4+ 4+ 3- 3+ 
Latvia 2004 4+ 4+ 3- 4- 
Lithuania 2000 3 4 3- 3 
Lithuania 2001 3 4+ 3 3- 
Lithuania 2002 3 4+ 3 4- 
Lithuania 2003 4+ 4+ 3 4- 
Lithuania 2004 4+ 4+ 3 4- 
Romania 2000 3 4 2+ 3 
Romania 2001 3+ 4 2+ 2 
Romania 2002 3+ 4 2+ 3+ 
Romania 2003 4+ 4 2+ 3+ 
Romania 2004 4+ 4+ 2+ 4- 
Slovakia 2000 3 4+ 3 4 
Slovakia 2001 3 4+ 3 3 
Slovakia 2002 3 4+ 3 4 
Slovakia 2003 4+ 4+ 3 4 
Slovakia 2004 4+ 4+ 3 4 
Slovenia 2000 3+ 4+ 3- 3 
Slovenia 2001 3+ 4+ 3- 3- 
Slovenia 2002 3+ 4+ 3- 3 
Slovenia 2003 4 4+ 3- 3 
Slovenia 2004 4 4+ 3- 3 
 
Economic Criteria 
Again, there are no NATO averages that can be used to compare to the above scores, but 
each score can still be interpreted to determine if the qualifications for membership were 
satisfied. At the time of accession, Bulgaria lagged behind significantly in ensuring that 
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competition policy was secure. Likewise, issues with implementing competition policy plagued 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Romania also had not finished 
integrating large-scale privatization into its economic system before it acceded. All of the states 
that joined NATO in 2004 were formerly part of the Soviet Union and operated under 
communist systems. Because these states were previously communist and needed to adopt a 
capitalist system, it was more difficult to bring about significant market reforms in just a little 
over a decade. NATO understood this and was more likely to admit these states based on 
strategic and defense reasons instead of focusing on economic issues with the new members.  
 Table 2.15 contains the data for the states that acceded to the EU in 2007 and the 
corresponding EU averages for each measurement.  
Table 2.15- 2007 EU Enlargement (Political Criteria) 
Country Year Democracy- Polity IV 
Human 
Rights- 
CIRI 
Political 
Dis- MAR 
Economic 
Dis- MAR 
Bulgaria 2003 9 5 0 3 
Bulgaria 2004 9 5 3 1 
Bulgaria 2005 9 6 1 1 
Bulgaria 2006 9 6 1 1 
Bulgaria 2007 9 6 . . 
Romania 2003 8 6 . . 
Romania 2004 9 5 3 3 
Romania 2005 9 6 3 3 
Romania 2006 9 5 3 3 
Romania 2007 9 5 . . 
EU Average 2007 9.74 6.88 . . 
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Analysis of 2007 EU Enlargement 
Political Criteria  
Both Bulgaria and Romania scored a 9 on democracy, which indicated a solid democratic 
foundation in society. However, both states scored lower on CIRI with Bulgaria scoring a 6 and 
Romania scoring a 5. In the year before accession, Bulgaria managed to bring its economic and 
political discrimination scores up to a 1. On the other hand, in 2006, Romania’s political and 
economic discrimination scores still sat at a 3. A score of 3 for political discrimination implies 
that minority groups are under-represented and the government is not doing enough to help.156 
When Romania acceded to NATO in 2004, it scored a 3 on economic and political 
discrimination. Even though Romania’s discrimination scores did not improve over the next 
three years, it still joined the EU in 2007. As with other states that joined the EU like Estonia and 
Hungary, problems with respecting minority groups were very common among the new EU 
members.  
 Table 2.16 includes the data for economic liberalization for Bulgaria and Romania. 
Table 2.16- 2007 EU Enlargement (Economic Criteria) 
Country Year Price liberalization 
Trade/Exchange 
Policy 
Competition 
Policy 
Large-scale 
Privatization 
Bulgaria 2003 4+ 4+ 2+ 4- 
Bulgaria 2004 4+ 4+ 2+ 4 
Bulgaria 2005 4+ 4+ 3- 4 
Bulgaria 2006 4+ 4+ 3- 4 
Bulgaria 2007 4+ 4+ 3- 4 
Romania 2003 4+ 4 2+ 3+ 
Romania 2004 4+ 4+ 2+ 4- 
Romania 2005 4+ 4+ 2+ 4- 
Romania 2006 4+ 4+ 3- 4- 
Romania 2007 4+ 4+ 3- 4- 
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156 “CIRI Human Rights Data Project Coding Manual,” 
http://www.humanrightsdata.org/documentation/ciri_coding_guide.pdf, Accessed: 9 February 2013. 
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Economic Criteria 
Romania and Bulgaria both received a score of 3- for competition policy in 2007. Over 
the course of the years leading up to accession, though, both states managed to increase their 
price liberalization, trade and exchange systems, and large-scale privatization scores so that they 
are closer to EU standards. However, both countries struggled and ultimately did not manage to 
meet the minimum standards especially for competition policy before they acceded in 2007.  
Table 2.17 includes the data for the states that acceded to NATO in 2009 along with the 
NATO averages. 
Table 2.17- 2009 NATO Enlargement (Political Criteria) 
Country Year Democracy- Polity IV 
Political Dis- 
MAR 
Economic Dis- 
MAR 
Military in 
Politics- 
PRS 
Military exp. 
as % of GDP- 
World Bank 
Membership 
in OSCE? 
Albania 2005 9 1 3 5 1.31 Yes 
Albania 2006 9 1 3 5 1.54 Yes 
Albania 2007 9 . . 5 1.82 Yes 
Albania 2008 9 . . 5 1.97 Yes 
Albania 2009 9 . . 5 2.05 Yes 
Croatia 2005 9 3 3 5 1.62 Yes 
Croatia 2006 9 3 3 5 1.70 Yes 
Croatia 2007 9 . . 5 1.65 Yes 
Croatia 2008 9 . . 5 1.86 Yes 
Croatia 2009 9 . . 5 1.82 Yes 
NATO 
Average 2009 9.5 . . 5.46 1.82 
Yes (all NATO 
members are 
also OSCE 
members) 
 
Analysis of 2009 NATO Enlargement 
Political Criteria  
While Albania exceeded NATO’s 2% target, Croatia did not spend as much as was 
required on defense spending by the time it acceded in 2009. Both Croatia and Albania had 
difficulties with respecting minority groups. The two states did, however, have functioning 
democracies and were already members of the OSCE.  
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 Table 2.18 contains the data for the measures of economic liberalization for Albania and 
Croatia.  
Table 2.18- 2009 NATO Enlargement (Economic Criteria) 
Country Year Price liberalization 
Trade/Exchange 
Policy 
Competition 
Policy 
Large-scale 
Privatization 
Albania 2005 4+ 4+ 2 3 
Albania 2006 4+ 4+ 2 3 
Albania 2007 4+ 4+ 2 3 
Albania 2008 4+ 4+ 2 3+ 
Albania 2009 4+ 4+ 2 4- 
Croatia 2005 4 4+ 2+ 3+ 
Croatia 2006 4 4+ 2+ 3+ 
Croatia 2007 4 4+ 3- 3+ 
Croatia 2008 4 4+ 3- 3+ 
Croatia 2009 4 4+ 3 3+ 
 
Economic Criteria 
As with many of the countries that acceded to NATO in 2004, Albania and Croatia both 
struggled to enact reforms that guaranteed competition policy in the new market economy. When 
Albania acceded in 2009, it only scored a 2 in terms of competition policy while Croatia scored a 
3. These scores suggest that there are “some enforcement actions to reduce abuse of market 
power and to promote a competitive environment.”157 However, further reform was needed. The 
two states’ scores in the other areas of economic reform are acceptable, though. Both states made 
strides in the years leading up to accession to bring their economic standing up to NATO 
member state levels.  
 
Analysis of the Findings  
 In looking at the data over time, NATO and the EU admitted some member states that 
met all of the institutional requirements, but also admitted states that did not. During the Cold !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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War, NATO and the EU did not really have formal criteria, but beginning in the 1990s, both 
organizations had established a list of conditions for accession. NATO and the EU both expected 
that member states would have stable democracies, a market economy, and a respect for minority 
rights. Based on the scores for each variable, states that joined NATO and/or the EU in the post-
Cold War era did not always satisfy the criteria as the institutions originally envisioned. NATO 
and the EU looked for a stable market economy and Poland did not deliver when it acceded to 
both institutions. The EU and NATO hoped that new member states would demonstrate respect 
for minority groups and Romania fell short. Even for the states that entered NATO and the EU at 
different times, there was little noticeable improvement in the time between the different states 
becoming full members in both organizations. The same weaknesses that plagued states when 
they joined NATO came up again when they prepared for EU membership.  
 Admitting member states that did not meet some of the institutional membership criteria 
represents a certain risk for both NATO and the EU. For example, NATO admitted several 
member states since 1999 that did not meet the 2% target spending on defense. In 2012, only 
four of NATO’s twenty-eight members met the target on defense expenditures.158 Even though 
NATO has admitted many new states since the end of the Cold War, not all of these states have 
been able to contribute substantially to defense spending. Because NATO admitted states that 
had underdeveloped market economies, these new members did not have the economic 
foundation to generate military and defense benefits for the alliance. On the other hand, the 
EC/EU took a risk in admitting states that had not met the institution’s criteria. The EU sought to 
create an identity that was based on respect for minorities and human rights. By admitting states 
that did had difficulty supporting minority groups and were occasionally in violation of human !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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rights, the EU undermined its credibility as an institution. Moreover, the EU is heavily dependent 
on states’ economic resources since the institution was founded on the principle of economic 
integration and prosperity. Consequently, if the EU allows states to join with questionable 
economic credentials, it runs the risk of putting a strain on its own economy as well as the 
economies of the other member states. NATO and the EU both wanted to unite the European 
continent, but both organizations took a risk in admitting new members who did not meet all of 
the political and economic criteria that each institution adopted.   
Now that these states have joined both organizations, it is not likely that they will seek to 
improve their democratic, human rights, minority rights, and economic standards unless 
compelled to by the organizations. Both the EU and NATO cannot exercise the same influence 
over states to bring about democratic and economic reform since the powerful carrot of 
membership has been used up. Instead, NATO and the EU should have been more cognizant of 
the gaps in membership criteria fulfillment. More interesting still, if NATO and the EU knew 
about these gaps and omissions, why did they still expand? Member state interests, institutional 
interests, and political reasons can all play a role in determining who joins and who does not.  
In the next three chapters, I will look at three separate case studies for states that joined 
both organizations at around the same time. Based on the data that I collected in this chapter, it is 
evident that these states (Spain, Poland/Hungary, and Romania) did not satisfy all of the criteria 
or presented weak applications for membership, but were still admitted. I will first look at 
enlargement during the Cold War and then move to post-communist enlargement in Eastern 
Europe for the final two case studies.  
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Introduction  
 Enlargement was on both the EC’s and NATO’s minds when they were initially created 
as evidenced by Article 237 and Article 10, respectively. During the Cold War, the institutions 
pursued expansion and both admitted Spain. Spain presents a compelling case study since it 
joined both NATO and the EC in the 1980s during the height of the Cold War. It acceded to 
NATO in 1982.159 In 1986, it acceded to the then-European Community (EC, later the EU).160 
Prior to 1975, both organizations would not consider Spain as a potential member because 
Franco ruled the country as a dictator.161 Once Spain emerged as a fledgling democracy, NATO 
and the EC were both receptive to its membership petitions. Spain improved democratically and 
economically during the 1970s and 1980s after the end of the Franco regime, which contributed 
to its success in acceding.162 In this first case study, I will look broadly at Cold War enlargement 
in the context of Spain’s accession.  
NATO and the EC had general membership criteria in place at the time of Spain’s 
accession. The two institutions required that Spain be a democracy. NATO also required that 
Spain contribute to the common security while the EC looked for liberal economic trends in the 
Spanish economy. In this chapter, I will look at Spain’s accession to each organization. To begin, 
I will look at a brief history of Spain in the twentieth century, analyze Spain’s pre-accession 
relationship with both the EC and NATO, assess whether or not Spain was ready for admission, 
and conclude with a discussion of how the case of Spanish accession encouraged the 
development of new, explicit membership criteria in the 1990s. I find that Spain met the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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institutional requirements for both NATO and the EC. It was admitted to each organization with 
little difficulty especially once it adopted democracy after 1975. This reinforces the idea that 
enlargement during the Cold War was relatively unproblematic and not controversial as it would 
become later. The Spanish case study will look broadly at how enlargement proceeded during the 
Cold War era. Spain complied with the institutional criteria for each organization so it did not 
encounter much resistance to its membership ambitions, but later applicants would experience 
more difficulty. This chapter sets up the enlargement process as it evolved during the Cold War 
and provides an analysis of how future enlargement would progress.   
 
Spain under Franco 
 The Spanish Civil War began with a military rebellion in 1936 with Francisco Franco and 
his forces emerging as the victors and new leaders of Spain.163 By the end of 1936, both Hitler 
and Mussolini recognized Franco as Spain’s legitimate leader.164 When World War II ended in 
1945, though, the European states and other interested parties (i.e. the United States) 
strengthened economic ties with Spain. Franco’s regime, though dictatorial in nature, provided 
great political stability that inspired confidence in Spain’s markets.165 As long as political 
stability seemed intact, outside investors and economic agents came to rely on the security of 
property rights and were more likely to continue investing.166 
A UN Resolution barred Spain from working with the UN, but the United States still 
sought to expand economic and military relations with Spain.167 Despite Franco’s tight grip on 
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Spanish politics, his regime was authoritarian, not totalitarian because there was some pluralism 
in society in terms of the freedom of expression.168 The limited political space for participative 
politics was not sufficient to satisfy NATO and the EC when they looked at Spain as a potential 
member. Both organizations required that Spain make a complete democratic transformation 
before they accepted the state’s bid for membership.169  
Even though Spain was not eligible to join NATO or the EC until it established a 
democracy, NATO and EC member states still maintained an interest in the country as a source 
of economic and defense potential. For example, the U.S. took an interest in Spain because of its 
critical geographic location. For strategic reasons, the U.S. established a series of military 
agreements with Spain in 1953 (known as the Madrid Pacts) that allowed the U.S. to construct 
bases on Spanish soil.170 By 1957, Franco recognized the need to increase Spain’s economic 
opportunities and called for the formation of a new government that would work towards the 
goal of integrating into Europe.171 Spain continually displayed its willingness to become a 
member of both NATO and the European Community as evidenced by signing a preferential 
agreement with the EC in 1970 and establishing defense agreements with NATO before 
accession.172  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the EC and NATO did not have formal or 
extensive membership criteria until 1993 and 1995, respectively. For all Cold War enlargement, 
both organizations proceeded on a case-by-case basis in order to determine states’ readiness for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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accession, but the organizations relied on their founding treaties to guide enlargement decisions 
at the same time. For each aspiring member state, NATO and the EC often had specific 
requirements that were designed with the prospective member in mind. Generally speaking, Cold 
War enlargement did not present the same set of difficulties as post-Cold War enlargement did. 
Prior to the 1980s, the majority of states that entered NATO and the EC in the Cold War era had 
similar political and economic backgrounds as the current member states, but Spain does not 
have a similar background, which makes it an interesting and useful case study. In Spain’s case, 
both NATO and the EC waited out Franco’s rule and required that Spain transition towards 
democracy before accession. Since both organizations’ inception, they have acknowledged that 
“Spain was clearly a Western European state in geographical and historical terms.” 173 
Accordingly, both institutions maintained that when Spain established a democracy, it would be 
assured of admission.174 In the meantime, Spain courted favor with both institutions beginning in 
the 1950s. It was not until the 1980s, though, that it acceded.  
In order to finally gain accession, Spain needed democracy. After Franco’s death in 1975, 
Spain moved quickly to establish a democratic system of governance with significant support 
from the European Parliament and the Assembly of the Council of Europe; these two groups 
traveled to Spain and met with Spanish political organizations to discuss the transition.175 
Elections were organized and the Spanish Parliament adopted a resolution that included “the re-
establishment of trade union rights [and] the legalization of all political parties.”176 By the 1977 
elections, Spain appeared to be on the path to democratization. International political 
organizations continued to remain involved in the Spanish transition to democracy by providing !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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political parties with the financial means to remain viable in national politics.177 After the June 
1977 elections, Spain officially became a parliamentary democracy and could now seriously 
pursue membership in NATO and the EC.178 Intent on gaining membership in NATO and the 
EC, the Spanish king, Juan Carlos, visited the United States in 1981 to discuss how to join both 
organizations.179 He wanted to divert “the Spanish military from its obsession with domestic 
politics” and viewed NATO and EC membership as essential in accomplishing this.180 Now that 
Spain had a democracy, membership in the two institutions was within reach.  
 
Spain’s Negotiations with NATO  
 As a key member of NATO, the U.S. established military and economic ties with Spain, 
which hinted at its interest in seeing Spain join the alliance. Franco’s death in 1975, several 
NATO member states including the U.S. supported Spain’s accession now that Franco was no 
longer in power and the state had transitioned to democracy.181 Spain’s accession did not happen 
that quickly, though. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) rejected Spain’s membership in May 
1975 because the country did not have a fully consolidated democratic system.182 Despite the 
fact that Article 10 of the Washington Treaty did not require that aspiring members have a 
democracy, the NAC refused to consider Spain as a potential member until it satisfactorily 
demonstrated that it was democratic. The reason for this was for Spain to enter the alliance with 
a democratic foundation that was similar to the other member states. Further complicating 
Spain’s ambitions to join NATO, it faced domestic pressure from its own left-wing opposition in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
177 Ibid, 133.  
178 Ibid, 150.  
179 Paul Preston, Juan Carlos: Steering Spain from Dictatorship to Democracy, (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2004: 493-494.  
180 Ibid.!!
181 Francisco José Rodrigo Luelmo, “The Accession of Spain to NATO,” Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur 
l’Europe (CVCE) (2012): 2NAT.  
182 Ibid.  
Wall 81 
the Spanish Parliament.183 Despite earlier resistance, in 1976, Spain renewed its commitment to 
joining NATO by suggesting the “future participation by Madrid in the plans of the Atlantic 
Alliance.”184 The 1977 democratic elections in Spain compelled NATO to remove the political 
veto on Spain and the institution now took Spain’s membership ambitions seriously.185 The 
attempted coup convinced Spain that political and military stability could be found in NATO 
accession. Spain also thought that NATO membership would cement democracy’s place at the 
center of the national politic and increase its chances of joining the EC; Spaniards were fearful of 
a return to a dictatorship and NATO’s insistence on democratic reforms before accession was 
well received.186  
 
Spain Accedes to NATO: 1982 
 Before Spain acceded to NATO in 1982, it needed to comply with Article 10 of the 
Washington Treaty and also display evidence of having a functioning democracy. Article 10 
specifies that each new member state should be able to contribute to the alliance’s security.187 
The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Spain states that NATO was 
“satisfied that the security of the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accession of the 
Kingdom of Spain to that Treaty.”188 NATO was concerned primarily concerned with European 
security and (as soon as Spain was democratic) supported the state’s accession since it was 
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strategically located and could contribute to increasing security against external threats.189 Based 
on Spain’s 1977 democratic elections, NATO concluded that Spain was a consolidated 
democracy by the time of accession in 1982.190 The democratic requirement was not included in 
the Washington Treaty, but the NAC made clear that Spain would not be admitted without a 
democracy in place. Establishing democratic governance thus became an informal requirement. 
NATO’s attention to democracy at the time of Spanish accession paved the way for the 
institution to eventually create a formal set of accession criteria that included democracy. On the 
other hand, NATO determined that Spain could contribute to collective security with its strategic 
location, its commitment to defense spending, and its ability to add to the NATO defense 
network.  
The Washington Treaty’s Article 10 emphasizes that a new member state must uphold 
the terms of the treaty and “contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.”191 Strategically 
located on the European continent, Spain represented a key asset for the military alliance. The 
military agreements between the U.S. and Spain that began in the 1950s highlight the “military 
links” between Spain and NATO as well as NATO’s other members.192 Spain’s accession can 
also be thought of as a move to counteract U.S. influence over NATO by increasing European 
states’ representation in the military alliance; on the other hand, the U.S. was a primary 
proponent of Spanish accession because of the military and defense benefits it would derive from 
Spain’s membership. As a result, both the U.S. and the European members of NATO viewed 
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Spain’s membership as an important, strategic move for the alliance albeit for slightly different 
reasons. Specifically, European states hoped to expand their military strength so that they did not 
have to depend entirely on the U.S. for defense, protection, and security needs. From a realist 
perspective, this implies that the U.S. and other member states were hoping to maximize their 
power by adding Spain. After “NATO faced the structural problems caused by a self-confident 
and economically prosperous group of states that were in a decidedly unequal military 
relationship with a superpower.”193 NATO and its member states believed that Spain could help 
to fill several gaps in military defense that the alliance was confronting at the time. Spain’s 
inclusion would offset U.S. dominance in the alliance. For example, Spain was situated at “a 
crossroads of international commerce and communications,” which represented a military and 
geographic advantage for NATO. 194  NATO also envisioned constructing a rear base for 
operations for its military activities on Spanish soil.195 Spain could also be used as a base to 
launch an attack if a war with the Soviet Union were to drive European powers as far west as 
Spain.196  
In addition to contributing to collective security, NATO members must also be 
democratic, according to the institution. NATO could not, in its view, admit Spain to its 
organization while it was still under the Franco dictatorship. According to Mark Smith, 
“Admitting Franco would be admitting a regime of the very sort that had overturned European 
democracy in the 1930s and 1940s, and as such, was wholly unacceptable.”197 Franco’s ties to 
both Stalin and Mussolini gave NATO pause when it considered Spain’s membership petition. 
His death in 1975 prompted Spain to apply for membership, but the North Atlantic Council !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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would not grant admission until Spain demonstrated that it could hold free and fair elections, 
which it did in 1977. The NAC’s and by extension NATO’s immovability on the issue of 
democracy revealed the newfound belief that the military alliance had to be built around a group 
of democratic states. Once Franco died and Spain held democratic elections, NATO could no 
longer postpone Spanish accession.  
With its new democratic requirement, NATO demonstrated that it was willing to pursue a 
liberalizing agenda in the new member states. As an institution, it recognized that it had the 
capacity to require a democratic system before integrating new members into the democratic-
military alliance. By establishing that democratic states formed the bedrock of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, NATO was able to present itself as a clear contrast to the Soviet Union and 
the Warsaw Pact since they subscribed to communism. NATO’s mandate as an institution 
evolved into promoting democracy. In this way, it was able to set an agenda that was 
independent of the member states. The member states individually clamored for NATO to admit 
democratic states, but NATO acted as an institution to establish that expectation. Through 
enlargement, the institution gained more normative power.  
Once Spain joined NATO in 1982, it began to subscribe to the widely held view that 
NATO accession could be used as a stepping-stone to eventually join the EC.198 Spain had 
always looked on NATO membership as a means to an end: eventually joining the EC. The next 
section will look at Spain’s negotiations with the EC and its path to membership in the 
Community.  
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Spain’s Negotiations with the EC 
 In the 1950s, Spain began to entertain hopes of joining the European Community. As 
early as 1957, Spain prepared itself for eventual EC accession by forming the Inter-ministerial 
Commission for the Study of the European Economic and Atomic Communities (CICE).199 
Spanish Foreign Minister Fernando María Castiella sent an official application to the President 
of the EEC Council of Ministers in 1962 to open the discussion about Spain’s membership 
aspirations.200 For Franco, Spain’s admission to the EC would reap significant economic 
benefits, and he hoped to avoid political confrontation while pursuing membership.201 When 
Spain attempted to join the EC in the early 1960s, only then did the Community issue a statement 
indicating that non-democratic states were ineligible for membership. In spite of Spain’s interest 
in joining the EC, the Parliamentary Assembly rejected Spain’s application on the following 
grounds: 
“Those states whose governments are not democratically legitimated and whose peoples 
do not partake in the political decision-making, whether it be directly or by means of 
freely elected representatives, cannot expect to be admitted to the society of peoples 
which form the European Communities.”202 
 
Despite the EC’s position that it would not admit Spain until its government was democratic, 
Spain did not give up. In February 1964, “the Spanish government formally submitted their 
second association request.”203 After that, the EC agreed to look at economic cooperation with 
Spain; from 1966-1970, the EC and the Spanish negotiated an economic agreement.204 Franco’s 
death in 1975 helped to put Spain on the path to democratization, which would aid its EC 
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accession aspirations.205 By 1977, Spain held its first free and fair general election and a new 
democratic constitution was formally implemented in 1978.206 In early 1977, the President of the 
European Council issued a statement that made clear that “enlargement was an investment in 
Europe’s democratic future.”207 The 1977 election helped to legitimate democratic governance in 
Spain and EC accession seemed assured.  
 Although Spain had satisfied the EC’s requirements for democracy, membership did not 
follow immediately thereafter. Instead, Spain’s quest for membership was met with some 
resistance especially from France. In the 1970s, France expressed fears that Spain’s accession 
would be “unbearable for French agriculture.”208 Once the Spanish economy began to revive 
itself, though, France saw clear economic benefit with Spain as an EC member rather than as an 
outside rival.209 As Mark Smith notes, “It was obvious, then, that the powerful neighbor was 
changing her mind as the Spanish economic threat was gradually taking shape.”210 France’s key 
role in determining the fate of Spanish accession reveals that member states’ material and 
economic interests could significantly influence enlargement decisions.  
Because of France’s initial resistance to Spanish membership, Spain was not admitted 
right away even though it had established a democracy. Instead, Spain acceded to the EC in 
1986, a little more than a decade after it became a democracy. As soon as its economic fortunes 
began to improve, France and other EC member states supported Spain’s membership ambitions. 
In addition to the belief that economic prospects would be enhanced with new members, EC 
members generally acknowledged that Spain had always been a member of Europe.211 Therefore, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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in order to reunite Europe, Spain’s accession must be accepted. Before it could accede to the EC, 
though, Spain knew that its democratic and economic credentials needed to be in order. It 
received support from several key member states, though. The member states’ opinions could 
sway the EC to move towards enlargement or not. Loukas Tsoukalis states that the Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG) advocated on behalf of the pro-Spanish lobby at the EC.212 Not only 
did member states verbally offer their support, but, in the case of the FRG, they can also become 
actively involved in promoting expansion. Even though France was initially wary of Spanish 
accession, it ultimately supported its neighbor. This will be elaborated on in the next section.  
Prior to offering membership to Spain in 1986, the EC recognized that the country had to 
first clear some important hurdles. The challenges facing Spain included “an underdeveloped 
rural region, a large migrant workforce working abroad and agricultural productions that was in 
need of CAP support.”213 Instead of prohibiting Spain’s accession because of its economic 
weaknesses, the EC saw an opportunity to implement “a number of reform and policy resolutions 
[that] were required in order to clear the road for Spanish…entry.”214 Because the EC was 
interested in deepening European integration with the ultimate goal of establishing a single 
market, Spain’s accession allowed it to lay the groundwork for this goal.215 The EC was 
beginning to use enlargement as a mechanism to support the “reform, policy development, and 
the internal dynamics of the Community.”216 Now, more than ever, enlargement could be used as 
a political tool to promote the institution’s economic agenda.  
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Spain Accedes to the EC: 1986  
 Spain acceded to the EC under the terms of the Treaty of Rome’s enlargement article 
(Article 237), as well as the EC’s 1962 declaration that new members must have “democratically 
legitimated” political systems.217 As with NATO, the EC’s Treaty of Rome did not include the 
requirement that states be democratic when they become full EC members. According to the 
Commission Opinion rendered on 31 May 1985, the report also mentioned the need for “pluralist 
democracy” to be present in a country that was entertaining membership goals. 218  The 
Commission’s Opinion helped to reinforce the earlier declaration that insisted that new members 
display evidence of a democratic system.  
Based on Spain’s democracy scores for the five years leading up to accession, the country 
had successfully implemented democratic reforms when it was admitted to NATO in 1982 and it 
maintained its democratic identity in the years leading up to its EC accession in 1986. Spain’s 
promising progress in the area of democratic development and implementation represented a 
source of great hope for the EC. When the EC was faced with a Spanish membership application 
for admission, it recognized Spain’s progress in the areas of economic and democratic 
development and began to support Spain’s accession. Because Spain was now a democracy, the 
EC could begin to move Spain through the membership process since it had satisfied the 
democracy requirement.  
According to the IMF’s data from 1986 (the year of Spanish accession to the EC), Spain 
had some flexible arrangements and restrictions on payments for capital transactions.219 Spain 
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had already established several of the key features of a liberalized economy, but it did not have 
all of the flexible economic arrangements in place or bilateral payment arrangements with other 
states and organizations.220 Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Spain’s rate of inflation increased 
dramatically when compared to other EC member states.221 Countries like France had strong 
reservations about Spain’s accession; France held back its unqualified support because it did not 
want to make any concessions that “might prejudice the economic interests of France and 
particularly the French farmers.”222 Germany, on the other hand, favored Spain’s accession for 
political and economic reasons.223 Arguably two of the most powerful and influential actors in 
the EC, Germany and (eventually) France’s support for Spanish accession helped to bring about 
Spain’s admission in to the EC.   
 There were economic gains to be had with Spanish accession, both for the member states 
and the EC at large. According to one study, “Spanish membership increased EC land under 
cultivation by 30 per cent and for fresh fruit by 48 per cent.”224 At last, French farmers were 
appeased and supported Spain’s admission. Once France had the backing of its people, it was 
able to push for Spain’s accession at the institutional level. The institution and its member states 
were well positioned to obtain material benefits from the increased economic coordination 
between different European member states, which was one of the major forces pushing 
enlargement forward.  
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Analysis of the Findings  
 In summary, NATO and the EC were interested in pursuing Spanish membership, but 
wanted to ensure that the country was a democracy before offering membership. Looking 
broadly at Cold War enlargement, most of the cases were less problematic than later cases would 
be because these states were already considered part of Western Europe. Instead, states admitted 
after the 1960s had to demonstrate achievement in democratic governance before NATO and the 
EC would accept their membership petitions. NATO required that the new states contribute to 
security of the North Atlantic region while the EC had economic expectations for its new 
members. Spain’s admission to both NATO and the EC proved to be a pivotal moment in both 
organizations’ histories. Neither organization had specific membership criteria until the 1990s. 
Instead, they relied on declarations and the brief description of enlargement found in each of 
their founding treaties to determine if states were eligible for membership. When Spain began to 
gear up to join both organizations in the late 1970s, NATO and the EC wanted to ensure 
democratic continuity in their organizations so they each separately resolved that Spain would 
not be admitted until it proved itself to be a fully functioning and consolidated democracy. After 
the 1977 elections, both NATO and the EC were satisfied that Spain was on the path to 
democratization.  
 Spain was also important because it served as the connection between Cold War and 
post-Cold War enlargement. Spain joined NATO and the EC in the 1980s; both the EC and 
NATO did not admit new members again until 1995 and 1999, respectively. Spain’s admission 
to both institutions ended the era of Cold War enlargement. It also signaled that NATO and the 
EC would begin work on a clear set of membership criteria to avoid the confusion and delays 
that accompanied Spanish accession. If both organizations were to establish clear membership 
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expectations, then aspiring members would know what areas they needed to improve on. 
Streamlining the accession process would also put all aspiring members on a level playing field 
so that they were all playing by the same set of rules. In addition, clear criteria components 
would allow NATO and the EC to assess states’ progress as they continued on the road to 
membership. After the end of the Cold War and the new applications from Eastern Europe for 
membership in NATO and the EC, the two organizations codified official criteria using some of 
the same criteria that they used to determine if Spain was ready for membership in 1982 and 
1986, respectively.  
 Overall, Spain met the membership expectations that NATO and the EC had developed 
up to the point of its admission. On the NATO side, Spain was poised to contribute to security in 
the North Atlantic region and had implemented a stable democratic system by the time it joined. 
For the EC, though, Spain faced a little more resistance because the thought was that Spain might 
be an economic drain on EC resources and markets. Spain met the EC’s democracy requirement, 
but its economic system was considered unstable since it was still emerging from the shadow of 
a dictatorial past. However, Spain gained admission because it was later determined that it could 
provide extensive economic benefits for the EC members including additional land cultivation 
and economic coordination.  
With its transition to democracy, Spain could more easily prevail on NATO and the EC 
to grant membership. Spain transitioned to democracy under the second wave of 
democratization. The general consensus after World War II was “that democracy…was the most 
powerful and advanced form of political arrangement.”225 Therefore, if NATO and EU member 
states were committed to democracy, then the institutions would have an “advanced political !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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arrangement” and a common political framework that could be used for collective decision-
making. The decades following World War II often fall under the second wave of 
democratization, during which democracy becomes the most beneficial political system.226 The 
goal of increasing institutional power thus motivated NATO and the EC to uphold democracy in 
new members as a way to ensure that the “most beneficial political system” was available to 
them.  
In keeping with member states’ material and non-material interests, the members 
supported Spain’s accession if they thought they could derive economic benefit in the form of 
new trade opportunities or greater economic cooperation. Another NATO material interest was 
the acquisition of land for new military bases that could be built on Spanish soil. Keen on 
increasing its military capabilities, NATO advocated for Spain’s accession. Non-materially, both 
the member states and the institutions viewed Spain as a traditional member of the West. In order 
to expand European unity and spread liberal, democratic values, the member states and the 
institutions both favored Spain’s eventual admission. During the 1960s and on, both NATO and 
the EC took it upon themselves to mold their respective institutions into democratically based 
organizations. The formal criteria that both adopted in the 1990s reflected this initial desire to 
ensure that new members were democratically stable. Domestic pressures also influenced 
member states to favor expansion. For example, Germany’s precarious geographical location 
motivated it to seek the increased security that adding new members would afford.   
 Spain’s admission to NATO and the EC came a critical moment when both institutions 
were readjusting their priorities and membership expectations. Though Spain can be considered 
the last of the Cold War enlargement cases, its admission impact still resonates with new 
members since it spurred both institutions to adopt explicit membership criteria. In the next !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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chapter, I will take up the first of two post-Cold War enlargement cases. Using Spain as the 
contrast case from the Cold War era, I will seek to explain how enlargement progressed 
differently when former Soviet states began the institutional membership process in the 1990s 
and 2000s. From there, I will analyze whether these new states met the membership criteria that 
NATO and the EU adopted after the Cold War’s end. I will continue to elaborate on why both 
institutions proceeded with enlargement despite the risks associated with adding new members 
(especially if the new members failed to fulfill institutional membership criteria).  
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Introduction 
 This chapter will compare and contrast two states that entered NATO and the EU at the 
same time. Both Poland and Hungary joined the two European institutions after the Cold War 
ended. Their admission to NATO in 1999 was the institution’s first post-Cold War 
enlargement.227 When Hungary and Poland joined the EU in 2004, numerous EU Commission 
reports indicated that they did not meet all of the institutional criteria by the time of accession. 
The data from Chapter 2 also indicates that Poland and Hungary had not met all of the 
institutional criteria for NATO and the EU (this will be explored further in the chapter). In this 
second case study, I will look at two similar accession stories to analyze what membership 
qualifications were not met. Records indicate that Hungary had not met the institutional 
requirement of respecting minority rights and populations as well as certain military obligations 
that NATO required of its members. On the other hand, Poland did not satisfy institutional 
requirements for a stable market economy and did not implement all of the EU’s tax regulations 
and reforms when it finally acceded. Even though Poland and Hungary each had separate 
problems satisfying the membership criteria, they were both still admitted to NATO and the EU. 
I will look at gaps in the membership criteria for these two states and then answer the question of 
why NATO and the EU admitted Poland and Hungary despite their flawed membership 
applications.  
 Unlike Spain, Hungary and Poland had to satisfy specific membership criteria as outlined 
in the EU’s 1993 Copenhagen Criteria and NATO’s 1995 Study on Enlargement. Post-Cold War 
enlargement encompassed an effort to make membership contingent on satisfying institutional 
criteria. To begin, I will cover a brief history of Hungary and Poland in the communist and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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postcommunist eras, analyze their pre-accession relationship with both the EU and NATO, and 
assess whether both states were ready for membership based on each institution’s standards. I 
will then conclude with a discussion of why the institutions enlarged if the new states did not 
meet the requirements. At the same time, I will reflect back on the Spanish case study to draw 
parallels and contrasts between Cold War and post-Cold War enlargement. I find that both 
Poland and Hungary struggled to satisfy different elements of the membership criteria while 
adequately meeting others. Poland lacked economic credentials while Hungary did not have 
military contributions and infrastructure that were in keeping with NATO’s expectations. 
Hungary also struggled to uphold respect for its minority populations. By looking at separate 
criteria components that states attempted to fulfill, I draw conclusions about each institution’s 
reaction to new members’ desire to implement the necessary requirements, but difficulty in doing 
so. I also look at why NATO and the EU still pursued accession even if the new states did not 
seem ready for the rigors of membership as evidenced by an inability to fulfill some parts of the 
membership criteria. I will begin with a brief history of Poland and then look at Poland in the 
context of NATO and EU expansion.  
 
Case Study: Poland- Democracy Without Economic Credentials  
History of Poland: The Communist and Postcommunist Era 
 During the communist era, sparks of protest politics and resistance began to emerge in 
Poland. Under Lech Wa!"nsa, the Solidarity movement positioned itself as a cornerstone of 
resistance to the Soviet Union.228 New pockets of resistance to Soviet rule grew steadily within 
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the country. Caution held the Solidarity movement back from moving too quickly to topple the 
regime because the regime could retaliate with its coercive power. The combined efforts of 
Solidarity and the Catholic Church allowed Polish society to become an actor and introduce the 
political reforms that ultimately led to democracy.229 The 1989 elections proved to be a 
watershed moment in Polish politics. In January 1990, the Polish Communist Party voted to 
disband itself; Poland could now begin its transition to democracy.230  
 Contrasting sharply with the rest of the postcommunist world, Poland had political and 
religious institutions (i.e. Solidarity and the Catholic Church) that fostered the emergence of civil 
society and the move towards democracy. This fact alone helped to propel Poland on the path to 
democratization once it started to seriously consider NATO and the EU membership in the 
1990s. Poland also had the “most extensive and elaborate networks of opposition groups…in the 
Soviet bloc.”231 Poland had a historical base of protest politics in civil society that could push for 
democratic change. As Polish protests continued to open civil and political society, state actors 
were more likely to embrace democratization once regime breakdown ended. Because of both 
institutions’ activism during the regime breakdown, they laid the groundwork for future 
democratic progress, especially now that the concepts of protest politics and civil society were 
deeply ingrained in the Polish paradigm. When the next political crisis arose, the Poles could 
depend on the power of protest politics within civil society to ensure that the state remained 
undeterred in its quest to implement democracy. Protest politics help to create healthy 
democratic society that would serve Poland well during its integration into major European 
institutions like NATO and the EU. By the 1990s, Poland had successfully established a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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consolidated democracy, conducted free and fair elections, opposition candidates had an 
opportunity to gain power, and the transfer of power from one party to another was peaceful.232 
Poland’s postcommunist transition to democracy was very successful, but the country did not 
fare so well economically when it put forward its membership application.  
  
Poland and NATO 
Polish Accession to NATO  
 According to NATO’s 1995 Study on Enlargement, new members must have a 
democracy, a market economy, a respect for minorities, a commitment to the peaceful resolution 
of conflicts, be able to contribute militarily to NATO’s operations, and implement democratic 
control of the military.233 When Poland acceded to NATO in 1999, it had democratic control of 
the military, seemed positioned to contribute militarily to the organization, had a democracy as 
well as respect for minority groups, and had indicated its willingness to resolve conflicts 
peacefully. However, a crucial criteria element that Poland did not quite meet was the economic 
criteria. While Poland struggled to liberalize its economy, Hungary experienced difficulties with 
respect for minority populations.  
 In terms of the economy, Poland’s major issue areas were price liberalization, 
competition policy, and large-scale privatization. Poland had made some progress on price 
liberalization and state involvement in price setting had been limited.234 As important as price 
liberalization is in the Polish transition, price stabilization is also a necessary condition for 
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effective reform. 235  Price stabilization is highly correlated with price liberalization in 
postcommunist states.236 In order to achieve the most stable price system possible, Poland needs 
to match up price stabilization and price liberalization. Based on its price liberalization and price 
stabilization scores, Poland was poised to be very successful on this economic front. On the other 
hand, just under 50% of formerly state-owned enterprises and assets in Poland are being shifted 
over to private ownership, which is a discouraging number.237  
Poland’s competition policy included some enforcement mechanisms to ensure a 
competitive environment and the promotion of a market economy, but its score on competition 
was the lowest compared to the other measures of economic liberalization.238 Although Poland 
adopted a general competition law in 1990, it still has problems with the dominance of larger 
firms.239 This was problematic from a liberal economic standpoint. If Poland could not control 
competition within its own borders, then it would be ill-prepared for membership in an 
international institution. Quantitatively speaking, as I demonstrated in Chapter 2, Poland did not 
display a solid grasp on its economic reforms when it was admitted to NATO, but it still 
managed to join as scheduled in 1999. Poland’s economic progress was interrupted by elections. 
According to Balcerowicz (a reputable Polish economist and mastermind behind Poland’s shock 
therapy economic program): 
“It is clearly better for [elections] to be organized in the fourth year of the 
implementation of an economic program (as in Hungary) rather than in its first year (as in 
Poland).”240 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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 Poland held elections in the mid-1990s, which disrupted the progress of economic reform 
as Balcerowicz states. Because of the change in power, Poland’s political leadership did not 
always support the move to economically liberalize. Power changes at the highest levels of 
government after elections (which prompted governmental inconsistency in reforming the 
economy) and a weak competition policy were the main reasons for Poland’s lack of 
preparedness to be a NATO member. In addition, tax and expenditure reforms “suffered from 
delays and a lack of ambition.”241 Because the tax police wielded power in Polish society, it was 
difficult for the governments to monitor taxation. Instead, the government implemented limited 
reform on tax policies in the hopes that NATO would be satisfied. After Poland’s shock therapy, 
it seemed likely that the country would be on track to become a full market economy. However, 
tax and expenditure reform continued to limit the Polish government’s attempts to achieve a full 
market economy. Poland’s inability to implement tax and expenditure reforms from the mid-
1990s to the late 1990s contributed to its lower scores on competition policy, price liberalization, 
and large-scale privatization.  
Because Poland was significantly in debt to Western states, NATO worried that it might 
not be prepared for the rigors of membership especially since it had several unresolved economic 
issues.242 The fact that NATO admitted a state that was mired in debt was a risky move, but it 
suggests that the institution saw potential in Poland as a full-fledged member. NATO was 
primarily interested in expanding security and stability. By admitting Poland, it could build up a 
defense network that would counteract Russian influence from the East. Moreover, member 
states strongly favored Polish accession, which will be discussed in the next section. Poland’s 
debt was concerning, but because Poland was indebted to the West, it made sense for NATO to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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admit the state so that it could monitor debt repayment over time. From a strategic, defense, and 
military angle, Poland was a valuable candidate for membership even though its economic 
credentials were of questionable credibility.  
 Despite Poland’s lack of readiness to join NATO (according to its economic membership 
criteria), it still joined in 1999 along with Hungary and the Czech Republic. The question is: why 
was Poland still admitted? Dominant member states in NATO pushed for Poland, as well as 
Hungary and the Czech Republic, to join the organization. A U.S. Department of State 
publication on NATO enlargement argues that expansion is good for American security because 
it will help to prevent future conflicts in Europe, it will make the Alliance stronger and better 
able to address future security challenges, it will help consolidate democracy and stability in 
Central Europe, and it will help erase the Cold War dividing lines.243  
European member states, on the other hand, also supported Poland’s accession because of 
the military muscle the state could provide. As of November 1997, Poland, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic had 80,000 tanks and other combat vehicles that it could contribute towards 
European defense.244 This display of military might impressed the European member states of 
NATO and compelled them to support Polish accession. While the U.S. advocated for 
institutional expansion, its four reasons imply a concern about material and non-material 
benefits. The U.S. (and other member states) wanted to spread democracy (non-material) and 
also increase safety, stability, and security in Eastern Europe and Europe as a whole (material). 
Because of Poland’s military capabilities, though, the NATO member states expanded with the 
intention of strengthening the alliance (material benefits). Even though Poland did not satisfy the 
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economic membership criteria, it received support from the existing member states that were in 
favor of its eventual accession. Member states supported Poland’s accession on the grounds that 
the state could further the institution’s defense objectives by providing military equipment. Also, 
the members believed that admitting Poland would help to spread security throughout Eastern 
Europe now that the Cold War had ended.  
 
Poland and the EU 
Polish Accession to the EU 
 The EU Commission reports from 2001-2003 suggest that Poland adhered to some EU 
membership expectations, but accession as early as 2004 may have been a bit premature. Since 
the EU requires that states have democratically legitimated governments, Poland worked to 
implement democracy and was highly successfully since the EU never questioned that Poland 
was a full democracy. Democracy is listed as the first set of membership criteria in the EU’s 
Copenhagen Criteria, which conveys its importance in the institution’s eyes. The Commission’s 
2001 report makes clear that Poland had satisfactorily achieved “the stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law.”245 Poland also had successfully demonstrated that 
it was in compliance with EU standards regarding respect for and protection of human rights and 
freedoms.246 Democracy, human rights, and civil and political rights all constitute the EU’s 
political criteria. As evidenced by the positive comments associated with Poland’s quest to 
implement the political criteria, the state satisfied the political aspect of the membership 
requirements with few questions asked.  
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 Economic criteria proved to be more challenging for Poland. The Commission’s 2001 
report indicates that trade issues continue to bog down Poland’s bid for membership (i.e. 
implementation of the Custom’s Code). 247  If Poland does not have a liberalized trade 
environment, that will complicate trade negotiations and relations at the supranational and 
institutional level, which is concerning for the EU when it is considering granting Poland 
membership. EU Commission reports did express optimism that Poland could integrate into the 
EU’s economic system, but held back from asserting its complete confidence in Poland as a 
viable and economically liberal force. The 2000 EU Commission report also found that Polish 
economic policies lacked coordination and cohesion, which has contributed to a decline in 
economic activity, a rise in unemployment, and a weak monetary policy.248 The Commission 
also implies that significant reform must be undertaken before the EU will approve Poland’s 
accession. By the time Poland joined the EU in 2004, it had made progress in its economic 
reforms, but questions and concerns lingered. The issue of economic reforms plagued Poland as 
it pursued EU membership.  
The 2003 EU Commission report on Poland’s progress stated, “Privatization considerably 
slowed down in the past two years and the pace of privatization in the first months of this year 
has been disappointing.”249 In most cases, Poland started the necessary economic reforms, but 
did not go as far as the EU hoped it would. According to the Commission, Poland needed to 
continue restructuring its heavy industries and accelerate privatization.250 With regards to the 
acquis, the Commission found that while Poland was adopting important provisions in the EU’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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comprehensive body of laws and regulations, the enforcement mechanism and administrative 
capacity were not always present, which were areas for improvement.251 
To summarize Poland’s compliance with EU membership criteria, the state had 
democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. Even though Poland had liberalized 
economically, it did not complete all of the internal reforms it needed to meet the EU’s economic 
requirements. Arguably, the EU was not looking for applicant states that had perfect scores on all 
of the criteria components, but they were certainly looking for states to not have glaring gaps or 
omissions in their membership applications. Because Poland lagged in terms of implementing 
competition policy, privatization, and did not adopt all of the EU’s economic regulations, it 
failed to fully meet the economic requirements for membership. In the next section, I will look 
into Poland’s inability to meet the economic criteria and offer an explanation for why the EU still 
accepted Poland as a new member.  
 Poland’s price liberalization and trade scores were satisfactory, but its competition and 
large-scale privatization scores should have given the EU pause. Because Poland was eager to 
join the European Union and was in compliance with the other membership criteria components, 
the EU appeared to overlook Poland’s economic gaps. The European Union was certainly aware 
of Poland’s difficulty in establishing a solid competition and monetary policy since the 
Commission’s progress reports point out these flaws frequently in several different reports. 
Based on Poland’s accession experience, it is evident that the EU placed greater emphasis on the 
fulfillment of political criteria and believed that once the new state joined the Union, its economy 
would eventually inch upward. Because the EU is a liberal, democratic body, it paid special 
attention to new members’ satisfaction of political criteria. If the EU were to admit a state that 
was less-than-democratic, it would undermine its own institutional identity. However, by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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admitting a state with a struggling economy, the EU could work with that state to bring its 
economic credentials up to institutional standards over time. Thus, the EU was more favorably 
inclined towards Poland because it shared its liberal identity; this is an example of the EU acting 
to construct a certain identity in another state. The EU’s competitive, economically stable 
environment would naturally boost Poland’s own economy so the worries about Poland’s 
economy would be temporary.  
 As mentioned in the NATO section, Poland also failed to meet EU tax requirements and 
regulations in the years leading up to accession. Although Poland became an official EU member 
in 2004, the EU acknowledged, “priority still is needed to be given to improving the efficiency of 
tax collection and fiscal control.”252 Even though it was unlikely that Poland’s economic 
credentials would be in line with EU standards by the time of accession, EU officials did not 
foresee any problems with Poland’s eventual accession. One EU official said quite bluntly, “To 
be sure, Poland is the biggest country amongst the candidates, but not the greatest problem.”253 
However, as the notion of a “return to Europe” took shape, the EU, as an institution, looked 
favorably on Poland’s membership and viewed its admission as a necessary part of restoring and 
reuniting Europe.254 The EU and its member states also looked at enlargement from a material 
and self-preservation angle. Paul Latavski notes, “Extending European integration eastwards can 
offer a constructive framework for the nationalism of the peoples of Eastern and Central Europe 
and lay to rest Western fears of Balkanization.”255 If the EU wants to promote a democratic and 
united Europe, then it must follow through on enlargement offers so that it can maintain its 
credibility. Also, since the EU is concerned about the possibility of Balkanization, bringing the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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CEECs into the fold will allow the institution to monitor the economic, political, and military 
situation in Eastern Europe.  
 Interestingly, the EU also identified clear benefits in adding Poland, specifically in terms 
of balancing out Germany’s growing political and economic influence. As the German economy 
has grown, so too have the Central and Eastern European economies also grown, which 
contributes to positive economic growth for the EU as a whole.256 This was noticeable even 
before the CEECs acceded to the EU and was further developed after many of the CEECs were 
admitted to the EU. At the institutional level, the EU determined that the German economy could 
aid the Polish economy if Poland joined the Union.  
With this in mind, the EU chose to add Poland in 2004 even though it was not prepared 
economically. The EU saw an opportunity to augment institutional material and non-material 
benefits through Polish accession. While Poland was mainly concerned with molding its 
economy to fit NATO and EU standards, Hungary encountered other problems as it inched 
towards membership. Specifically, Hungary had issues with respecting minority populations and 
did not meet NATO’s expectations on military and defense contributions. As in the case of 
Poland, Hungary still acceded. The institutions and member states carefully calculated their 
material and non-material interests. Deciding that enlargement was in both groups’ interests, the 
EU and NATO accepted Hungary despite the country’s flaws. Even though there were many 
forces that brought about Poland’s accession to the EU, the most important drive behind 
Poland’s membership was the belief that, as a democracy, Poland was ideologically similar to the 
rest of the EU member states and would have little trouble integrating into the institution. Eager 
to promote its democratic identity, the EU and its member states identified with Poland and 
supported its membership aspirations.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Case Study: Hungary- Democracy and Economic Reform without Minority Rights  
History of Hungary: The Communist and Postcommunist Era 
 Much like Poland, Hungary had established a fully consolidated democracy by the 1990s 
and was the most politically stable of the postcommunist states.257 Also like Poland, Hungary 
had a history of democratic development and liberalization, which helped to facilitate its 
transition to democracy after the end of the Cold War. Dissatisfied with the Soviet Union’s 
economic system, Hungary opened itself up to Western business and investment.258 In October 
1989, the new Hungarian Republic was announced.259 Hungary’s democratic transition differed 
from Poland’s. There were fewer political openings in civil society in Hungary until the 
Hungarian republic was declared. At that point, there was more space in civil society for reform.  
 The newly elected Hungarian political leaders supported Hungary’s move towards 
democracy, capitalism, and European integration.260 After a series of political power changes 
throughout the 1990s, the Socialists and the Alliance of Free Democrats regained control of the 
Parliament in 2002.261 The FiDeSz (a center-right party) won control of the parliament in 
2010.262 Their victory constituted the resurgence of the right in Hungarian politics. Rightist 
parties tended to focus on traditional home values and were more skeptical about European 
integration. The right’s comeback in Hungarian politics is also connected to other political issues 
such as less certain democratic footing and less respect for minority populations both politically 
and economically. Even though Hungary had established a consolidated democracy by the time it 
joined both NATO and the EU, it did not always respect and protect its minority population’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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civil rights and political liberties, which will be discussed in the next section. Both NATO and 
the EU require that states look out for their minorities and Hungary has struggled to do that. In 
addition, NATO still admitted Hungary in 1999 even though Hungary failed to adopt all of the 
required military protocols and requirements that NATO looked for. Hungary was in partial 
compliance with EU and NATO requirements, but not in full compliance. This will be discussed 
in the next section.  
 
Hungary and NATO 
 As demonstrated by its Polity IV and its economic liberalization scores, Hungary had 
satisfied NATO’s political and economic criteria at the time of accession in 1999. Hungary’s 
years of peace and stability during the post-Cold War era demonstrated its commitment to the 
NATO value of resolving conflicts peacefully and Hungary was also a member of the OSCE. 
Hungary failed to meet institutional expectations in the areas of military contributions and was 
unsteady in terms of civil-military relations. When NATO set Hungary’s accession date for 
March 12, 1999, it hoped that the country would make the necessary military contributions by 
that time and prove that it was ready to be entrusted with membership.263 Unfortunately, by 
1999, Hungary “could only meet 60 percent of its [military] membership commitments.”264 The 
question is: what might have prompted NATO to accept Hungary even though it was not able to 
fulfill all of the membership requirements?  
 Although Hungary and Poland did not meet all of the membership criteria, they each 
struggled with different aspects (Poland on economics and Hungary on military contributions 
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and respect for minority populations).265 If NATO was not going to reprimand Poland for 
insufficient privatization or price liberalization, then it should not punish Hungary for not 
implementing all of the military requirements. Because NATO was more focused on moving 
countries along the path towards accession, it was less concerned with taking countries to task 
for not fulfilling certain aspects of the criteria.  
 Moreover, if NATO had planned an enlargement wave for a certain date and time, it 
would want to do everything in its power to keep states’ progress toward accession on track. 
NATO needed to ensure that its offer of membership was credible. If at the last minute NATO 
had to withdraw a membership offer, it would appear indecisive and this act might even 
discourage states from continuing the application with hope of joining NATO at a later time. In 
addition, NATO wanted to actively integrate and socialize (politically and economically) states 
that it has cited as future members. If the member states do not gain admission at the pre-
determined time and date, then NATO will appear as though it has not done enough to encourage 
and motivate aspiring states.  
 Since NATO (especially the dominant member states) strongly supported a return to 
Europe, it was more likely to overlook or even forgive states’ inability to meet all of the 
membership criteria. Hungary and Poland were both required to implement the 1995 NATO 
Study on Enlargement membership criteria. Although Hungary had met a majority of NATO’s 
requirements, on January 14, 1999, it announced that it would “not comply with NATO force 
goal targets.”266 Not only was Hungary unable to meet all of NATO’s military requirements, but 
it was also, to some extent, unwilling. In further testament to Hungary’s military unpreparedness, 
Chief of Staff Ferenc Vegh stated that after membership, Hungary would still have to improve in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the areas of “air defense and air space control modernization, foreign language instruction, 
improvements in reconnaissance, and increasing the combat capacity of rapid reaction troops.”267 
Because of the military benefits that Hungary offered, NATO brought Hungary into its ranks as 
planned in 1999. Reasons for enlargement in spite of deficiencies in membership criteria 
fulfillment stemmed from an interest in harnessing Hungary’s military power. The fact that 
Hungary had met a majority of the membership requirements also played out in its favor and 
NATO supported its accession.  
 
Hungary and the EU 
 The EU Commission reports from 2001-2003 chart Hungary’s progress as it pursued 
membership. Although the 2001 report acknowledged that Hungary had implemented a 
consolidated democracy, it stressed that Hungary must work to eliminate corruption and develop 
a consistent jurisprudence.268 In terms of respecting minority groups’ rights, Hungary (and the 
EU) needed to push forward the Roma action programme to prevent economic, political, and 
cultural discrimination against the Roma people living in Hungary.269 Minority representation in 
the parliament remains low and the EU Commission made clear that this can be rectified.270 The 
EU’s political criteria states that new members must respect minority groups and have a fully 
consolidated democracy. Because the Commission had already affirmed Hungary as a 
democracy, the issue with Hungary’s membership lay with its ability to protect minority 
populations. In the 2001 report, the EU Commission pointed out that “Hungary does not have a 
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unified law on anti-discrimination.”271 Hungary’s police force also has a poor record in terms of 
treating minority populations with respect. International human rights organizations have 
“reported cases of unjustified and harsh police action against Roma people.”272 In addition to the 
brutal treatment that the Roma people receive at the hands of the Hungarian police, they live in 
deplorable conditions and face social and employment disadvantages.273 The Roma people 
constitute as much as 6% of the Hungarian population274 so the 2001 EU Commission report 
maintains that protection of Roma rights and opportunities must be enshrined in Hungary’s 
constitution before the state can join the EU.  
 By the time Hungary joined the EU in 2004, it presented an incomplete membership 
application to the Commission, but the institution still decided to accept Hungary. The 2000 
report pointed out that Hungary had yet to adopt an anti-discrimination law and the 2002 report 
indicated that Hungary had still not done so.275 In the last year (2001), respect for the Roma 
population has also not been upheld. Discrimination against the Roma people instead took on 
unexpected and undesirable forms. Reports from international organizations have indicated that 
there continues to be mistreatment, forced interrogation, and even a police raid on a Roma 
settlement, which is not in keeping with the EU’s expectations that members will respect their 
minority populations.276 The Minorities at Risk data indicates that Hungary scored a 3 on 
economic discrimination for the years 2000-2004.277 Hungary has policies on the books that 
prevent minorities from accessing equal rights and civil liberties, which is very problematic for 
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the EU. As mentioned earlier, the Roma people were overwhelming unemployed, which can also 
contribute to the concerning economic discrimination score.  
 To summarize Hungary’s compliance with EU membership criteria, the state had adopted 
democracy and the rule of law. The EU Commission reports also concluded that Hungary had 
met the economic guidelines and requirements to be considered a stable and functioning market 
economy. Where Hungary did not fully satisfy the institutional criteria was with regards to 
respect for minority rights. Repression of and discrimination against the Roma people continued 
to drive Hungarian policy towards minorities. Hungary did little to combat its anti-minority 
policies and practices. Instead, it lagged behind other states in meeting the minority rights 
membership criteria component. I will now offer an explanation for why the EU enlarged to 
include a state that had insufficient qualifications on some of its institutional membership 
criteria.  
 
Hungary and the EU: Analysis 
 Hungary’s issues with its Roma minority stretch back to the end of the communist era. 
After the end of state-mandated employment under communism, the Roma people were 
increasingly unemployed and lacked access to equal economic opportunities.278 Since the 1990s, 
Hungary has had difficulties with protecting minority rights, especially at the economic level. 
Economic discrimination against minorities has been the major cause of concern. Because of the 
violence and discrimination that the Roma people encounter, they emigrate often.279 “Violence 
against the Roma in Central Europe has enabled the group to seek asylum as victims of racial 
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persecution.”280 Because the Roma do not have economic opportunities and are fearful for their 
general safety and security, they immigrate to Canada in large numbers.281 The number of Roma 
asylum seekers has steadily increased since the year 1995 in various Western European and 
North American countries.282 Although economic disadvantages have motivated the Roma 
people to migrate, racial violence against the Roma also occurs in Hungary. The EU requires that 
all member states respect their minority populations, but Hungary had evidently not 
accomplished this by 2004 (the year of accession). The Roma people in Hungary had few 
employment opportunities and racial violence against their people was rampant. This was not 
acceptable based on the EU accession criteria.  
 Yet, Hungary still joined the EU in 2004. As with Poland, Hungary managed to meet a 
majority of the EU’s criteria, but the one blatant problem was the issue of respecting minorities. 
The Hungarian government repeatedly claimed that extremist groups and individuals were 
responsible for planning the attacks on the Roma people, not the government or another state 
actor.283 Hungary hoped that this proclamation would erase the problem, but it became evident 
(especially in the EU Commission progress reports) that the EU was still holding Hungary 
responsible for the actions of some of its deviant non-state actors. Because the 2003 EU 
Commission progress report does not acknowledge Hungary’s progress on the fulfillment of 
political criteria, it is logical to conclude that the institution believed Hungary had satisfied all of 
the political criteria. Based on MAR scores, though, Hungary was still having serious issues with !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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respecting its minority populations, which the EU overlooked when deciding to admit Hungary 
in 2004. Because the EU saw Hungary as strong on democracy and economic reform, it was fine 
with overlooking Hungary’s minority respect problems. Because several other EU member states 
and the institution itself were currently grappling with how to deal with minorities, the EU 
decided not to make minority rights the hold-up for Hungarian membership.   
 
Analysis of the Findings 
 Looking at the case of Hungary and Poland, it is clear that both states had established 
solid democratic standing when they acceded to NATO and the EU. Had the two states not 
proven that they were consolidated democracies, it seems unlikely that NATO or the EU would 
have accepted them as members. When Spain initially applied for membership in both 
organizations, the two institutions were of the same mind that a state must have evidence of 
democracy and a democratic identity before it could join. Because Spain was still living under a 
dictatorship when it first applied to join the EC, the EC refused to entertain its membership 
aspirations. Likewise, NATO stated that Spain could not join until it had a solid democracy. 
Hungary and Poland were both consolidated democracies so they had already cleared an 
important hurdle as they worked towards eventual accession. Arguably, both NATO and the EU 
value democracy above their other criteria because they refused to admit Spain because it was 
not a democracy, but remained favorable to Polish and Hungarian accession since both states 
were already democracies. Also, Poland and Hungary each had separate issues with the 
remaining membership criteria, but since they each had a democracy, NATO and the EU felt that 
they could excuse the two countries for other criteria issues. Because the post-Cold War 
enlargement waves contained states that struggled with different aspects of the requirements, 
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NATO and the EU had to treat each case as unique. Poland and Hungary each faced a different 
set of issues as they worked through the EU and NATO’s membership criteria. Post-Cold War 
enlargement taught the EU and NATO to examine each prospective member state individually. 
The 1999 wave of NATO enlargement (which included Hungary and Poland) was significant 
because it was the first time that the institution applied the membership criteria to the aspiring 
states. In short, the official criteria revolutionized how NATO and the EU conducted 
membership negotiations and forced states to confront their shortcomings while they were on the 
road to membership.  
 Despite Poland’s economic flaws, NATO and the EU both decided to admit it because it 
had advanced democratically and held similar ideological views as the rest of Europe. On the 
NATO side, Poland represented was a strategically located barrier against Russia; Germany 
wanted Poland to join for that reason. Germany assembled its national preferences and then 
brought them to the international stage (liberal intergovernmentalism) to advocate for Poland’s 
accession. NATO also admitted Hungary because it could contribute to the military alliance. 
Although the EC recognized Hungary’s issues with its minority population, the organization still 
decided to admit since the EC itself did not know how to resolve the question of the Roma 
people. The EC also recognized Hungary’s new democratic identity and wanted to admit the 
country to add to its pool of democratic states that were aligned economically in the Union. The 
final case study chapter will look at the EU’s last wave and NATO’s second to last wave of 
enlargement. Although Poland and Hungary seemed like potentially problematic members, they 
both met more than half of the required criteria for both organizations while Romania lagged 
behind in more criteria categories than one. I will use Romania as the case study to determine 
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why the EU and NATO might have enlarged despite the risks with an especially problematic 
new member like Romania.  
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Introduction 
 Romania’s accession to the EU induced a headache for the institution.284 The “headache 
case” will serve as my final case study. Romania joined NATO in 2004.285 Three years later, in 
2007, it joined the EU.286 Like Poland and Hungary, Romania was required to adhere to NATO’s 
1995 Study on Enlargement membership criteria and the EU’s 1993 Copenhagen Criteria. 
Romania’s admission to NATO and the EU raised several eyebrows as skeptics questioned 
whether Romania had met the economic and political criteria associated with membership. In 
this chapter, I find that Romania, like Hungary, struggled to uphold respect for its minority 
populations. In addition, the state lacked the appropriate market liberalization reforms especially 
in the areas of competition policy and large-scale privatization. In short, Romania was much less 
prepared for membership than any previous applicant country.  
 As with Chapter 4, I will continue to look at the impact of each institution’s accession 
criteria on the new waves of enlargement. To begin, I will cover a brief history of Romania in the 
communist and postcommunist eras, analyze its pre-accession relationship and negotiations with 
both NATO and the EU, and assess if it was ready for membership based on its fulfillment of the 
criteria. I will also analyze why the member states and the institutions themselves chose to 
enlarge if they knew about their prospective new members’ shaky economic and political 
standing. I will refer back to the Spanish case study to continue drawing contrasts between Cold 
War and post-Cold War enlargement. To begin, I will discuss a brief history of Romania and 
then look at Romania in the context of NATO and EU enlargement.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Case Study- Romania  
History of Romania: The Communist and Postcommunist Era 
 By the time Romania gained its independence from the Soviet Union, it had already 
broadened its economic sphere of influence beyond the USSR and was able to establish trade 
relations with non-communist states. 287  Emerging from the shadow of the Ceau#escu 
dictatorship, the Romanian government worked to consolidate democracy and integrate into 
European institutions like NATO and the EU. Romania demonstrated its interest in NATO and 
EU membership by undertaking the necessary political, economic, and military reforms required 
for accession.288 However, the new provisional government put a Ceau#escu loyalist in power; 
thus, it became clear that the movement towards democracy would be neither fluid nor quick.289  
Romania’s new leader, Ion Iliescu of the National Salvation Front (NSF), did not fully 
endorse democratization and elections conducted under his watch were free, but generally 
unfair. 290  Even though the Romanian people expressed a desire to join the democratic 
community, Romania’s underdeveloped civil society and strong isolationist policies under 
Ceau#escu limited the state’s ability to push for sustained democratic reform. The new 
government slowly inched toward democratization, but Romanians had hoped that democratic 
implementation would progress at a much faster rate. As Romania’s interest in establishing a 
democracy and market economy grew so did its desire to join NATO and the EU. Concerned 
with defending its borders and preventing Soviet/Russian influence from infiltrating Romanian 
society, Romania pursued NATO membership in the hopes of bringing a sense of security to the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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state while NATO also had security interests in mind. On the other hand, then-Romanian 
President Emil Constantinescu and then-Prime Minister Victor Ciorbea clearly stated that 
European and Euro-Atlantic integration  
“represented a major political priority for the country, the key to its foreign policy, and 
the only avenue for development in the national interest that would allow Romania to 
take its rightful place among continental Europe’s democracies.”291 
 
Both NATO and the EU offered new opportunities for Romania and the country was eager to 
integrate into Europe. 
 
Romania’s Pre-Accession Relationship with NATO 
With Romania’s increasingly serious ambition to become a full-fledged member of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO laid out the requirements that Romania needs to 
fulfill before membership. Romania must implement reforms in the following areas: military 
affairs, corruption, security of information, economic reform, the rights of children, minority 
rights, and trafficking in human beings.292 Once Romania completes these areas of reform and 
the reforms meet with NATO’s approval, the country must then satisfy other requirements on the 
economic, military, and political front. I will discuss these requirements in the following 
paragraphs.   
The general consensus in Romania in the years preceding accession suggests that 
economic reform was at the top of the list of priorities and that supporting the respect for 
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minority groups would take the backseat for a while.293 Recognizing that NATO’s membership 
criteria requires a well-established market economy in each prospective member state, Romania 
placed great emphasis on economic liberalization in the first decade after communism ended.294 
With the new presence of a market economy, Romania began to open up political space in 
society to allow for democracy to take root. In the 1990s, Romania sought to implement other 
free market forces and private ownership.295 By 1993, the government adopted an IMF-approved 
plan that included “progressive elimination of price subsidies for staple goods and services, 
removal of controls on interest and exchange rates, trade liberalization, accelerated privatization, 
and reduction in inflation.” 296  Despite Romania’s progress in the areas of economic 
improvement, the constant turnover in new governments undermined the state’s political 
stability.297 Various government coalitions with competing visions for Romania’s economic and 
political future disagreed on how to implement liberal economic and political reforms.298  
On military affairs, Romania proved itself a willing and capable partner for NATO. In 
January 1994, Romania joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.299 Joining the PfP 
is the first step in a serious pursuit of membership in NATO. In terms of defense spending, 
Romania has performed better than many current NATO member states. “Over the last decade, 
Romanian defense expenditures have exceeded 2% of the GDP every year but one.”300 Because 
many current NATO members are struggling to meet the defense expenditure requirement, 
Romania’s chances of gaining accession were improved because NATO looked to new members 
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to contribute militarily when the existing members were falling short. Since Romania displayed 
an interest in membership very early on, NATO was receptive to its membership appeals. As the 
country prepared for eventual NATO membership, it realized that it would need to implement 
laws to protect its Hungarian and Roma minority populations to satisfy NATO’s new 
membership requirements. The next paragraph will examine how Romania fared on respecting 
minority populations as well as how it met (or did not meet) NATO’s specific institutional 
requirements.  
 NATO’s 1995 Study on Enlargement requires that prospective member states have a 
functioning market economy, a stable democratic system, treat minority populations with 
respect, resolve conflicts peacefully, implement civil-military relations internally, and make a 
military contribution to the organization.301 Romania’s economic development experienced 
significant growth during the 1990s and early 2000s, but the state lagged behind some NATO 
members and other prospective members. Price liberalization and trade policy remained two of 
Romania’s greatest accomplishments in the area of economic reform. Romania’s progress in the 
areas of price liberalization, trade policy, and large-scale privatization are encouraging signs of 
the country’s economic recovery and advancement. One aspect of economic reform where 
Romania’s progress has not been so smooth is competition policy. Boosting competition policy 
in the postcommunist states presented a myriad of problems for the CEECs. Romania’s score of 
2+ on competition policy in 2004 suggests that there is some competition policy legislation set 
up, some reduction of entry restrictions, and some enforcement mechanisms that can be used to 
promote a competitive environment.302 Unfortunately, progress is limited and the country has 
shown little improvement over the course of the five years leading up to accession in 2004. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Because of Romania’s weak competition policy, there are barriers to developments in banking, 
retail, energy, and transport markets, which is increasing the cost doing business.303 As the 
barriers to trade continue to affect the Romanian economy, it will also impact the EU economy 
since the member states’ economies are closely connected and dependent on each other for 
economic prosperity.  
 Romania had a solid democracy and a strong showing in the area of military 
contributions. Consequently, NATO believed that the country would be in an excellent position 
to contribute militarily to the alliance. Romania also satisfied NATO’s democratic control of the 
military requirement based on its military in politics score and demonstrated its commitment to 
resolving conflicts peacefully by agreeing to a rapprochement with Hungary in the 1990s and by 
complying with OSCE principles.304 On the other hand, Romania struggled to adequately respect 
and support rights for minority groups in the country especially the Roma people. In 2004, 
Romania scored a 3 in economic discrimination and political discrimination against minorities. 
Despite Romanian political and diplomatic efforts, Europe has “so far been unable to integrate 
the Roma people.”305 Even though Romania did not meet the institutional requirements when it 
came to minority rights, the institution itself was uncertain about what to do about the Roma.  
While Romania satisfied NATO’s expectations on military contributions, democratic 
control of the military, democratic governance, and resolving conflicts peacefully, it ran into 
trouble with economic reforms and respecting minority rights. Despite Romania’s inability to 
satisfy all of the organization’s membership criteria, it still gained membership in 2004. The next !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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section will explore whether NATO recognized Romania’s membership criteria gaps. If NATO 
recognized, but ignored Romania’s flaws, then I will answer the question of why the institution 
enlarged despite the unfulfilled criteria.  
 
Romania and NATO: Analysis 
Even though Romania did not meet NATO’s expectations on the economic criteria and 
respect for minority rights, the organization still enlarged because it viewed Romania as capable 
in terms of meeting institutional strategic and military interests. As an active participant in the 
PfP, Romania demonstrated its sustained interest in NATO membership. Almost immediately 
after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, “Romanian President Ion Iliescu declared his 
country a de facto NATO ally.” 306 By joining the war on terror, Romania was able to deepen its 
ties to NATO, which helped its membership application later on. The 9/11 attacks spurred 
NATO to broaden its defense efforts to include combating terrorism. With Romania’s offers of 
air bases, territory, and more, NATO could expand its presence into Southeastern Europe and 
acquire new allies in the fight against terrorism. Consequently, NATO added Romania to the 
organization because the institution could satisfy its material interests, namely increasing its 
military power and defense capabilities. Romania’s admission contributed to NATO’s material 
benefits. Neoliberal theory indicates that states link together when they have interests in 
common. After 9/11, NATO and its members were concerned with expanding their defense 
network and Romania offered them the access they needed.   
 Romania remained willing to support the NATO mission. It sent troops to fulfill peace 
support, humanitarian, and peace enforcement missions in Afghanistan. 307  Romania’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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willingness to contribute military forces to NATO missions increased its credibility in the 
institution’s eyes. Because of Romania’s early involvement in NATO missions, the state already 
had a fundamental understanding of the institution’s agenda, capabilities, resources, and military 
power. Bringing Romania into the alliance would pose little difficulty because the country knew 
how to operate within the collective defense organization framework. If Romania were to join 
NATO, the alliance would gain a partner that could quickly and effectively adopt institutional 
goals and contribute to the organization’s missions.  
 By the end of the Cold War, Romanian society had developed a strong relationship with 
its army. When considering new members’ applications, NATO places great emphasis on the 
strength of the civil-military relationship in society.308 Romania had developed this relationship 
and democratic control of the military was well established by the time of accession. Even 
though Romania’s economic preparedness and support for its minority groups was weak, the 
country had proven itself militarily capable of meeting the responsibilities of membership. In the 
aftermath of the terrorist attacks in the U.S., NATO was looking for members to fortify its 
defense infrastructure. Romania offered to fill this security gap and NATO believed that the state 
could contribute to its international peace and security operations and missions around the world. 
 
Romania’s Pre-Accession Relationship with the EU 
 With the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, Romania began to pursue an economic 
relationship with the EU. Beginning in 1990, Romania established diplomatic ties with the EC 
and by 1991, Romania had signed a Trade and Cooperation Agreement with the Community.309 
Although implementing a trade relationship with the EU was crucial in Romania’s path towards !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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European integration, the country actively sought EU membership, not just more trade 
agreements. In 1993, Romania signed onto the Europe Association Agreement that is an 
indication of interest in institutional membership.310 Around the same time that Romania signed 
the Association Agreement, the EU published the Copenhagen Criteria, the official requirements 
of EU membership that would guide future waves of enlargement. Foremost among the new 
requirements was that states must have a market economy, be a democracy, and be able to fulfill 
the obligations that accompany EU membership. Eastern European states like Romania that had 
emerged from under communism were just beginning to experiment with both economic 
liberalization and democratic governance.  
 While Romania was on the road to membership, the EU supplied it with significant aid 
and resources to prepare for its eventual accession. For example, from 2000-2003, the EU gave 
Romania approximately 660 million euro each year in support of three key programs operating 
within the country: the Poland and Hungary Assistance for Reconstruction of Economy 
(PHARE), the Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), and the Special 
Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development (SAPARD).311 Although PHARE 
was originally developed with the intention of economically supporting Hungary and Poland 
when both states were acceding to the EU in 2004, the program remained in existence for the 
subsequent waves of EU enlargement.  
Through funding from PHARE, Romania could focus on institution building and 
generating investment support.312 By seeking investment from other states, institutions, and 
corporations, Romania could bolster its markets and maximize economic growth. Because 
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Romania was still coping with the legacy of its communist past, the institution building 
component of PHARE allowed the country to consolidate democratic institutions. On the other 
hand, ISPA funding provided Romania with rehabilitating environmental infrastructure and 
contributed towards improving the transportation system.313 Finally, SAPARD funding brought 
agricultural modernization to Romania’s rural areas. After the transition to a market economy 
and the liberalization of producer and food prices, agricultural production in many Central and 
Eastern European countries (Romania included) has decreased dramatically.314  
Because the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is a crucial component of the EU 
economy and its expenditure share composes the largest component of the EU budget,315 the 
institution pays attention to how well states are able to adopt the CAP while they are in the 
process of applying for membership. Questions about Romania’s economic readiness to join the 
EU remained. These concerns are only magnified when the EU looks at Romania’s 
underdeveloped agricultural sector. Moreover, Romania has several different minority groups 
whose rights it must protect, but this has been an area of reform that has come last or not at all in 
some cases. By the time of accession, Romania had not fully demonstrated that it was in 
complete compliance with the EU’s human rights and respect for minority rights criteria. Human 
rights, minority rights, economics, and agricultural reform are four key areas where reform was 
needed, but not necessarily achieved at the time of accession.  
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Romania and the EU: Fulfilling the Membership Criteria 
 Based on the EU’s political criteria, Romania came up short. The EU’s 2004 Regular 
Report on Romania’s Progress Towards Accession stated that Romania had successfully 
implemented a democratic system, but improvements were needed to root out corruption in the 
court systems and to offer more protection for individual liberties.316 The report commended 
Romania for integrating the Hungarian minority population, but cautioned that the Roma were 
still not fully integrated and their rights were not always respected.317 As for the court system, 
the report recognized a significant shortage of judges and questioned the fairness of some 
judgments rendered. Most startlingly of all, the report indicated that the EU did not recognize 
any progress made in the area of enforcing judgments in civil cases in Romania.318  
 Although Romania had made great strides in democracy and appeared ready to take on 
the obligations of membership, the EU Commission noted that discrimination against minority 
groups is still a problem. “De facto discrimination against the Roma minority continues to be 
widespread and the social inequalities to which the Roma community is exposed remain 
considerable. Living conditions are poor and access to social services is limited.”319 The Roma 
people in general do not have much of a political voice in society and are often politically and 
economically discriminated against. This is problematic for the EU because part of its 
membership criteria involves respecting minorities. If the EU does not withhold membership 
offers from states that are in violation of the criteria, then the institution loses some of its 
credibility. The question of why the institution has criteria in the first place also arises.  
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 For the most part, Romania was positioned to fulfill the responsibilities and obligations of 
membership, but agricultural reform was still an issue. For example, Romania lacks a security 
system for agricultural products, which the EU looks for in prospective members.320 Along with 
agricultural issues, the state of the Romanian economy gave the EU pause. The 2004 report 
stressed that Romania had achieved limited progress in economic restructuring, but complete 
market reform still had not been achieved.321 More importantly, the report articulates that 
Romania must continue to build on its economic growth if it hopes to be able to “cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.”322 When Romania joined the EU, the 
organization understood that it would be placed in direct competition with some of the most 
advanced economies in the world. Therefore, the EU was hesitant to invite Romania to join 
because it had not yet proven that it could remain competitive with some of the existing member 
states.  
 The EU Commission’s 2005 report stressed that Romania still needed to tackle reforms in 
the areas of “public administration, justice, anti-corruption, and protection of minorities and 
integration of the Roma minority.”323 Although Romania continued to display progress in terms 
of judicial reform, economic modernization, agricultural policy reform, and support for minority 
groups, the final EU Commission report issued before Romania’s accession in 2007 indicates 
that Romania still had not met all of the requirements for membership. The 2006 progress report 
makes clear that Romania needed to implement anti-corruption measures aimed at limiting 
abuses in the judicial system, increase respect for its minority groups, and augment its economic 
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competitiveness.324 Romania also encountered difficulties when attempting to fulfill the EU’s 
CAP requirements. Even though Romania did fulfill several key components of the Copenhagen 
membership criteria like the political requirements, it was not able to satisfactorily fulfill all 
aspects. However, Romanian still joined the EU as planned in 2007. The next section will 
examine what material and non-material interests were at play when the institutions and their 
member states decided on membership. The next section will also look at why the EU accepted a 
new member state that was not prepared for membership when it gained admission.   
  
Romania and the EU: Analysis 
 Enlargement to the East was thought to advance the “completion of political and security 
integration in the EU.”325 Once the Cold War ended, the EU looked for a way to consolidate 
itself as a political and a (new) security institution. Romania’s accession indicated that the EU, as 
in previous waves of accession, was intent on bringing new members in so that it could expand 
its political, economic, and security umbrella over all of Europe. Coupled with increasing 
security and stability, the EU also expanded to include states like Bulgaria and Romania in order 
to minimize the risk of conflict breaking out in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).326 Because 
the EU accepted Romania as a member in 2007, the organization could strengthen its position in 
the Balkans and extend its presence to the Black Sea.327 The EU wanted to do this so that it 
would have a more expansive presence on the European continent and would be able to reduce 
the threat of conflict breaking out in the Balkans.   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
324 “May 2006 Monitoring Report,” Commission of the European Communities (2006), 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/monitoring_report_ro_en.pdf, Accessed: 11 April 2013.  
325 Panos Tsakaloyannis, “EU Eastern Enlargement Policy and European Security,” in EU, NATO, and the 
Relationship Between Transformation and External Behavior in Post-Socialist Eastern Europe, ed. Reimund 
Seidelmann (Germany: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft and Baden-Baden, 2002): 14.  
326 Ibid, 41.  
327 Ibid.  
Wall 131 
 Even though Romania did not meet all of the membership requirements when it joined 
the EU, there is an interesting possible explanation for why the EU enlarged anyway: Romania’s 
willingness to adopt EU reforms is a sign of its “maturity to pursue reforms in a serious 
manner”328 sometime after accession. EU leaders reference the “historical opportunity” and 
“moral imperative” that are inherent in enlargement; the EU, as an institution, had a duty to 
enlarge to reunite Europe. 329 By reuniting Europe, the EU would be able to implement a liberal, 
democratic identity in new members, which is a non-material benefit of enlargement. Because 
the EU is an institution that has the power to effect positive democratic and liberal change in 
postcommunist states, the organization saw great benefits in enlargement activity as a result.  
 Although there was encouraging news about Romania’s economic growth, it still lagged 
behind other EU member states as it prepared for accession. Romania has managed to catch up 
with most member states economies’ in the realm of structural reform indicators, but progress on 
corporate governance is still not at current member states’ level.330 Competition policy is also 
weak in Romania, which is why the EU emphasizes in its progress reports that Romania is not 
prepared to join the competitive European market with its current economic growth. Again, the 
EU decided to accept Romania’s membership bid after weighing the security and political 
benefits that would come with this newest member. In addition, the EU also believed that the 
carrot of membership would encourage Romania to bring its economic standing up to 
comparable member states’ standards. As part of the EU’s liberal approach to enlargement !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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decision-making, the institution wanted to increase economic liberalization and trade 
relationships between different European countries.  
 The question of respecting minority populations, however, was still a very troubling topic 
for Romania and for the EU by extension. 1.8-2.5 million members of the Roma people live in 
Romania.331 Romania has the largest population of Roma peoples in all of Europe.332 The Roma 
people’s plight is difficult and while Romania has demonstrated an interest in protecting this 
group’s rights, not enough improvements had been made at the time of accession. The Roma 
continue to “lack access to government services and health care…suffer from high rates of 
unemployment and discrimination on the labor market.”333 Despite Romania’s difficulty with 
providing sufficient economic, political, and cultural protection for the Roma people, it still 
joined the EU.  
 Finally, Romania’s agricultural development had come a long way since the end of 
communism, but it was still untested and Romania, therefore, was not prepared for EU 
integration. Although agriculture was central to the Romanian economy, “slow macroeconomic 
reform and persistent recession have resulted in unfavorable conditions for agricultural 
development.”334 Due to the agricultural sector’s slow growth, the EU expressed some concern 
about admitting Romania. Ultimately, though, the EU determined that its own markets could 
supplement Romanian agriculture until it emerged as its own economic force. In summary, the 
EU decided to expand to include Romania for security and political reasons while also carefully 
analyzing the material and non-material benefits that would come with Romania’s accession. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The next section will analyze the findings from Romania’s integration into NATO and the EU 
while drawing contrasts with previous waves of enlargement.  
 
Analysis of the Findings 
 A common theme emerges from looking at NATO and EU enlargement: both institutions 
were willing to overlook applicants’ difficulty in satisfying certain aspects of the membership 
criteria if the organizations calculated that they could reap more benefits from admitting them 
anyway. However, as time went on, both organizations realized that they might need to carefully 
analyze states’ ability to be contributing and effective members of the organization. While 
Poland and Hungary both had one or two major issues with their membership applications for 
NATO and the EU, Romania has several issues including corrupt judicial systems, a struggling 
agricultural sector, economic underdevelopment, and weak support for minority groups’ rights. 
Romania was not alone, though. Bulgaria joined NATO and the EU in the same years as 
Bulgaria. Like Romania, Bulgaria joined the EU with a shaky standing on public administration, 
anti-corruption measures, a weak justice system, and protection of minority rights.335 These 
weaknesses and deficiencies only became more apparent with time.  
 Even though NATO and the EU viewed enlargement as a sort of “moral imperative” to 
bring peace and unity to the European continent, both organizations incorporated the specific 
membership criteria in the 1990s to provide a more structured format for institutional expansion. 
This way, states would be able to follow clear expectations and the enlargement process would 
be smoother. Not only that, but fulfillment of the membership criteria would ensure that states 
were as prepared as possible for membership. NATO and the EU both undermined the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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effectiveness of this system by admitting states that did not fulfill some or a lot of the criteria. 
Both institutions had compelling reasons for admitting the states anyway; material and non-
material interests like security or economic gains factored heavily in this endeavor. Over time, 
however, both institutions’ approach towards and feelings about enlargement changed.  
 Post-Cold War enlargement became a much more contested process with the addition of 
membership criteria. Enlargement during the Cold War proceeded with relative ease and took 
place in a more informal context. Member states heavily influenced the enlargement process 
during the Cold War, but post-Cold War enlargement has seen the emergence of a new set of 
formidable actors: the institutions themselves. Prospective members often interact with 
institutions during the enlargement proceedings. The EU, for example, releases progress reports 
on each aspiring member in the years leading up to admission. The membership criteria has 
given both the institution and the member states the ability to (as objectively as possible) 
evaluate states’ membership petitions. In the case of Romania, NATO and the EU played critical 
roles in facilitating Romania’s European integration.  
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Introduction 
 The European Union’s recent wave of enlargement in 2007 raised eyebrows and 
questions. Were the newly admitted states ready for membership? Did the institution ignore or 
fail to see insufficient progress in the areas of corruption and judicial reform for the new 
members? EU committees have issued stern warnings for future enlargement: “Enlargement 
fatigue (in the EU) and accession fatigue (in aspirant countries) could seriously threaten the 
future of the enlargement agenda.”336 What exactly is the future of the enlargement agenda? As 
of right now, the future seems uncertain. New states continue to send in applications for 
membership in NATO and the EU, but the institutions and the current member states have 
expressed a reticence for further enlargement. My thesis outlines how enlargement, at various 
stages in each institution’s history, was premature and accompanied by a series of unsatisfied 
membership criteria. More recent waves of institutional enlargement have come under fire for 
expanding too soon, when the new members were not prepared to take on the obligations of 
membership. Now that the carrot of membership has been used, the institutions have been forced 
to be creative with how they cajole members to improve on the basic tenets of membership like 
democracy, respect for minorities, and strengthening the market economy.  
In this final chapter, I will first go through an overview of my thesis, highlighting main 
points and key arguments. I will then look at the policy implications for enlargement for each 
organization, the member states, and aspiring members. To conclude, I will examine the politics 
and policy of the institutions today. I will look at how enlargement influenced and continues to 
influence political, economic, and cultural discussions at the institutional level. I will also 
explore contemporary issues that allude to broader themes of institutional behavior.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Overview of Thesis 
 The first chapter of the thesis laid the theoretical groundwork for the investigation into 
organizational enlargement. Each institution has specific reasons for pursuing enlargement 
depending on their needs and interests. Member states also played a critical role in swaying the 
decision in favor of admission if the members stood to gain economically, politically, or 
otherwise from adding new states to the organization. When the members decided to exert their 
influence over enlargement decisions, they often develop a set of national preferences and later 
bring these preferences to the institutional level for discussion and debate.337  
In the example of Spain’s accession in the 1980s, the U.S. had previously made a military 
agreement with Spain and was eager to enhance defense ties with the strategically located 
state.338 Because the U.S. is a powerful actor in NATO, it could establish its national preference 
(admitting Spain for strategic/defense reasons) and then convince the institution that Spain’s 
accession would reap significant benefits for the organization. This theory of liberal 
intergovernmentalism (establishing national preferences and then bringing them to the 
institutional level) factored heavily in arriving at enlargement decisions especially in the case of 
the U.S. and Spain’s accession as well as in the case of Germany and Poland’s accession. As the 
hypotheses suggest, both the institutions and the member states had similar goals and interests 
regarding enlargement, but the main question is who or what is driving enlargement. My thesis 
holds that both member states and the institutions have agency in enlargement decisions, but may 
exert their influence at different points and possibly for different reasons. 
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 Another theory holds that member states endorse enlargement in an effort to maintain 
influence, especially in a certain geographic region. For example, Waltz emphasizes that the U.S. 
only supported NATO enlargement in Europe because it was interested in maintaining a foothold 
in European affairs.339 From the very first NATO enlargement waves to the most recent, the U.S. 
has always been instrumental in expansion decision-making. The U.S. often had security, 
strategic, defense, and military interests at play when enlargement decisions were on the table. 
Given these many material interests, the U.S., according to realist Kenneth Waltz, was concerned 
about its own preservation as well as the general security of Europe. Consequently, enlargement 
became an important endeavor in the Cold War and post-Cold War era. The U.S. pushed for 
expansion to the East once the Cold War ended. According to a 1998 U.S. Department of State 
publication, the U.S. wanted to expand NATO’s security presence so that it encompassed Eastern 
Europe.340 However, the U.S. was not alone in its desire to spread liberal democratic reforms to 
Eastern Europe. Many other NATO member states recognized the necessity of supporting 
democratic development in the former communist states as crucial to the security and stability of 
the European continent.  
A realist theory specific to the EU involves how states look for economic benefits that 
they might be able to derive from new members. Krasnod"bski notes that the German economy 
would benefit enormously from adding Eastern European markets to the EU.341 Germany’s 
economic power would be increased and it would also gain new, geographically close trading 
partners. Germany saw the material benefits inherent in adding new members like Poland to the 
Union. With new members come new bilateral trade relations. Although Germany is often !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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mentioned as benefitting from Poland’s accession, other existing member states were also in 
favor of enlargement for the same reasons. Domestic pressures fueled by multi-national 
corporations also spurred the member states to respond by supporting enlargement.342  
Constructivism also shaped the trajectory of enlargement decisions. Commonly held 
European values, ideals, and liberal tendencies had a powerful effect on current member states 
and the institutions. The concept of identity also factored in heavily when deciding how to admit 
new members. States and institutions tend to favor those who are similar to them. If aspiring 
members were able to demonstrate their European nature, then states and the institutions would 
be more favorably inclined toward their eventual accession. As Curley suggests, states that 
identify very strongly with the group will be less likely to include newcomers.343 Therefore, 
prospective members that successfully prove their allegiance and adherence to the European 
identity will be much more likely to be approved for accession. Once aspiring members win over 
the current members, the road to membership becomes less conflict-ridden and more assured.  
If, however, the existing member states express serious doubts about a state’s readiness 
for membership, then that state’s accession is less certain. The notion of the European identity 
rests on the shoulders of democracy. Because both Poland and Hungary had consolidated 
democracies by the time of accession, there was little question that their identity would be in line 
with the rest of Europe. Identity is a fundamental component of a nation’s and an institution’s 
mission so its importance cannot be underestimated. Poland and Hungary were propelled 
towards membership in NATO and the EU because they were democracies and had proven 
themselves to be European, to the satisfaction of the members and the institutions themselves.  
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While the member states can exert pressure and influence over enlargement decisions, 
studies and research show that institutions retain this same capability. Barnett and Finnemore 
stress that institutions are autonomous actors and have the potential to steer the organization in 
one direction or another.344 For many of the same reasons as the member states, institutions 
support expansion. One key difference is that the institutions derive their authority from the 
members so they must respect and support their interests. When these interests and needs align, 
the process of enlargement is relatively non-controversial, but when members and the institutions 
have different interests, then difficulty arises.  
For example, in the case of Spain’s accession to the EU in 1986, France initially opposed 
the aspiring member’s application for membership. France believed that admitting Spain would 
deal a blow to the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and weaken the common market 
since Spain’s economic activity lagged behind the existing member states’.345 France’s resistance 
managed to hold up the enlargement proceedings for some time while EU officials contemplated 
how to appease France while still attempting to admit Spain. The careful, political balancing act 
between member states and institutions begins. Because the institution appealed to other material 
and non-material interests, France eventually changed its stance and became more open to the 
prospect of Spain’s membership. The EU was able to leverage its institutional weight to present 
the economic benefits that Spain’s admission would eventually produce while remaining 
committed to the goal of bringing a new state on board.  
The reasons for enlargement are varied, but the explanation for why states that did not 
fulfill all of the membership criteria were admitted is the question that this thesis has sought to 
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answer. Spain, Poland, Hungary, and Romania all experienced difficulties with implementing a 
functioning market economy. Hungary and Romania were weak on supporting rights for 
minority groups. None of the countries discussed in the case studies were admitted with a perfect 
score on all aspects of the criteria. Unlike many other states that were admitted in the early 
waves of enlargement during the Cold War, most of these states had rather glaring gaps in the 
membership criteria fulfillment. Spain’s admission was the least problematic of the group since 
both NATO and the EU had always assumed that Spain would eventually be admitted. Because 
Poland, Hungary, and Romania were all behind the iron curtain for most of the second half of the 
20th century, NATO and the EU did not expect that any of those states would one day be 
knocking on the door of membership. Both institutions needed time and resources to adjust to the 
idea of admitting Eastern European states to the two institutions of European integration. Once 
member states and the institutions adjusted to the idea, enlargement could follow. Still, though, 
NATO and the EU each admitted states that were not, according to the criteria, ready for 
membership. Both institutions’ lack of experience with cultivating membership ties with states 
that were not from Western Europe may have clouded the organizations’ ability to perceive 
faults clearly.  
Since both member states and the institutions actively participate in enlargement 
decision-making, it can be a crowded field with many opinions, insights, accord, and sometimes 
discord. Member states and the institutions have similar interests and needs when it comes to 
adding new states. If incoming states can demonstrate their willingness and ability to take on the 
burdens of membership, then the institutions as well as the members will often support their 
admission. If members and the institutions diverge sharply on opinions pertaining to 
enlargement, then it becomes a more contested process. One thing is clear: expansion can be 
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complicated and requires the input of both member states and the institutions. As long as aspiring 
states can prove that they are in compliance (more or less) with the criteria and can contribute to 
the non-material and material wellbeing of the existing members and institutions, then the odds 
of enlargement are quite good.  
 
The Policy Implications for Enlargement 
NATO 
 As mentioned earlier, enlargement fatigue has affected both NATO and the EU. The push 
for expansion in the years following the end of the Cold War appeared to diminish in intensity by 
the 2000s. Now, new questions have emerged about whether there is such a thing as too much 
enlargement and too much inclusion. According to Katharina Remshardt, further enlargement 
threatens NATO’s “homogeneity and manageability” and can negatively impact European 
security, broadly speaking.346 Therefore, by adding new states that have different historical and 
cultural legacies, it becomes more difficult to govern a collection of states that are dissimilar. 
This is a powerful argument against pursuing enlargement, at least for the foreseeable future. For 
states that are interested in membership, it appears unlikely that new waves of enlargement may 
come up soon especially for states that come from different historical backgrounds. For example, 
Georgia’s participation in the Membership Action Plan has been well received, but the country 
must still undergo substantial reform so that it can integrate into NATO. According to a U.S. 
Congressional Report, the Georgian military does not have standard Western-made or modern 
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conventional weapons at its disposal.347 If Georgia needs to build up its defense network so that 
it more closely resembles the rest of the alliance, then that will take time. NATO will most likely 
only grant membership once it is convinced that Georgia can join the alliance without incident. 
From this point on, it seems likely that NATO enlargement will slow down. 
 
EU 
 EU enlargement also appears to be proceeding more cautiously. As with NATO, 
enthusiasm for moving states down the road to membership is becoming less and less of a 
reality. As Sinnott points out, there are “modest levels of support for European integration and 
quite high levels of indifference.”348 Member states and the institutions are beginning to temper 
their support for expansion so that a careful assessment of states’ readiness to join can be made. 
This is due in part to the aspiring states that are hoping to join both institutions. States like 
Moldova and Ukraine have experienced great difficulty in pursuing EU membership because 
there are inherent cultural and political biases in the West against the former Soviet republics.349 
Now that the EU has to monitor Romania and Bulgaria’s judicial reform after both states had 
already joined the institution, it appears as though the EU will not be eager to add new members 
when it is concerned about its existing members’ progress. Both NATO and the EU have 
experienced the phenomenon of “enlargement fatigue” and are more determined than ever to 
carefully analyze prospective future waves of enlargement. The EU especially has questioned its 
willingness to allow Romania and Bulgaria into the Union when both states did not fulfill the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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basic membership criteria and needed to undergo significant reform even after admission. Now, 
though, both organizations are committed to expanding at a gradual pace that will allow them to 
determine how and when to add new members. 
 
The Politics and Policy of Today’s Member States and Institutions 
NATO  
Whereas enlargement took up a majority of the conversation during the 1990s, NATO 
and the EU have now begun to refocus their efforts. The U.S. is an important NATO member 
and its pivot to Asia has sparked speculation about how NATO might respond or even follow 
suit. The U.S. strategic pivot to Asia is based on three themes: security, economy, and 
democracy.350 Those three themes are also encapsulated in NATO’s membership criteria and in 
their general mission. NATO has largely followed the U.S. in the pivot towards Asia in an effort 
to encourage ties between Europe and the Far East. While the U.S. certainly influenced NATO to 
pursue an agenda focused on establishing trade relations with Asia, NATO took the important 
step to broaden its mission to the global, instead of just the regional level.  
 
EU 
 While NATO has been increasing its global presence, the EU has concentrated more on 
deepening its institutional structure while contending with the economic crisis that has gripped 
the organization since 2008. Enlargement has taken a back seat now that the EU is principally 
concerned with its financial stability. However, disputes at the highest levels of the EU 
government continue to trouble the Union. As the crisis worsens, member states are pitted !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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against each other. At a Brussels summit in 2013, “France, Spain, and Portugal [clashed] with 
Germany, Holland, and Austria over their demand for more time to meet their debt-cutting 
targets against a growing popular backlash against EU austerity.”351 Since austerity set in, the EU 
has not enlarged, but is scheduled to bring Croatia into the Union in the summer of 2013. The 
EU expressed confidence that Croatia will join with little difficulty and will not cause the Union 
the same headaches that Romania and Bulgaria’s accession induced when the two states joined in 
2007.352 Even though the EU is carefully monitoring both Romania and Bulgaria as they work on 
reducing judicial corruption and organized crime, the EU has not postponed future enlargement 
(as evidenced by Croatia’s imminent accession). For now, neither NATO nor the EU has given 
any indication that the enlargement agenda has been put on hold. Each institution continues to 
invite new members to adopt the Membership Action Plan (MAP) or sign a Stabilization and 
Association Agreement (SAA). Enlargement’s future seems active and bright.  
 
Final Thoughts 
 NATO and the EU are both European-based organizations, but have different motives 
and agendas when it comes to enlargement. To some extent, the institutions coordinated efforts 
to bring about a united Europe after the end of the Cold War, but maintained separate identities. 
Interestingly, both organizations admitted new states that were not ready for membership. For 
both NATO and the EU, the road to membership asked as many questions as it sought to answer. 
Cold War and post-Cold War enlargement took entirely different courses, but both incorporated !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
351 Bruno Waterfield and Denise Roland, “EU leaders to clash over austerity measures at summit as unemployment 
accelerates,” The Telegraph (2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/9930196/EU-leaders-to-
clash-over-austerity-measures-at-summit-as-unemployment-accelerates.html, Accessed: 18 April 2013.  
352 “Croatia on track for smooth accession,” EuropeanVoice.com (2013), 
http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/croatia-on-track-for-smooth-accession/76811.aspx, Accessed: 2 
April 2013.  !
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the goal of uniting Europe and bringing a sense of stability and security to the European 
continent.  
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